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Abstract

After exploring the successes, failures. and conflicting
explanations for results in two communications research
traditions, distraction and counter-attitudinal advocacy,
an attempt was made to explain these results in terms of
a more comprel1ensive theory.

Distractions were organ-

ized into classes defined by their strength and relevance
to the message, dernor1strat1ng how these and other factors

affected the persuasiveness of a message.

On the oasis

of this theory . an tlntested class of distractions, cogni-

tive distractions, were hypothesized.

This class of ·

distraction, related to cognitive dissonance, was then
used to integrate the conflicting research in counterattitudinal advocacy.

On the basis of this theory, a

model of the persuasive process was constructed and an
experiment testing the basic component:s of the model
deviseda

It was hypothesized that in the counter-

attitudinal encoding situation, reward and initial
attitude lvould be significant predictors of col.tnter and
consonant argument, which in turn would be significant

predictors of persuasion.

A central portion of the

hypothesis predicted tr1e manner in which attitude and

reward would

affec~

counter and consonant argument.

It persuasion was caused by a search for justification

for encoding a counter-attitudinal message, the dissonance
view, then reward would predict consonant argument.

If

the persuasion was due to distraction, then reward would
predict

c~~Dt_~r

argument.

A path analysis strongly sup-

ported the experimental model.
by

Persuasion was predicted

counter and consonant argument,

Consonant argument

was significantly predicted by initial attitude.

Counter

argument was significantly predicted by reward and reward
X. initial attitude.

As such, the results supported the

distraction hypothesis over the dissonance hypothesis as
the source of persuasion in the counter-attitudinal
situation.
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Chapter I - Introduction
The campfire. long bright, begins to dim.

The

excitement of the early songs and fellowship slowly
gives way to slower music, more serious interactions.
Finally, the fire reduced to a glow of darting ashes,
red with the heat of the fire that was, the storyteller
rises.

The story he tells is one that he had no witness

to, and in his first lines he says so, tracing the story
back through a friend who knew someone who heard the
story from someone ••• who knew.

The stories were in-

credible tales of feats hardly within the imagination,
never mind the physical grasp, of other men.
The council/camp fire has long been one of the most
common story-telling settings.

The stories may have been

the legends and mythologies of ancient or tr1bal cultures
or the horror stories more common to modern culture

but

the place where they most often and most effectively
were told was the fireside.

The most reasonable explana-

tion for this is natural selection.

Day was a time for

work with little time left for the luxury of legend.

In contrast, night provided enforced relaxation.
provided light to see by and heat to warm by.

Fire

It was

not light enough to work, but it provided an attractive
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relaxed

atmosphere~

one conducive to fellowship and

storytelling.
There is experimental evidence, however, that indicates that'the campfire may have been more than an
attractive setting for storytelling.

It may also have

been an i-mportant factor in the success of the story, in
the persuasiveness of the story.

If so, the choice of

the fire for such activity may not have been a product
of what could and couldn'-c be done at night so much as
what the fire could do for the story.

Ancient campfire

mythologies provided their peoples at once with a natural
history, religion, explanation of the worid and standard
for social o.r der.

The campfire, in this setting, may

have acted as a distraction, diverting the wandering

mind from mentally counter arguing with the story and
thereby giving the story, the tribal mythology, more
persuasive impact.

Chapter II - A Theory of Distraction
The concept that distractions could enhance the
persuasiveness of a message came in the wake of a methodological error in an experiment done by Allyn and
Festinger (1961).

Their purpose had been to test the

effect en persuasibility of forewarning the receivers
of an impending perstJasive communication.

Forewarning·

should, according to the prediction, decrease a subject's
persuasibility by allowing him the opportunity to marshal
arguments counter to those which might be used in a
persuasive message.

The prediction was supported.

Because the non-forewarned group was instructed
to concentrate on the personality of the speaker, an
instruction not given to the forewarned group, Festinger
and Maccoby suggested that the results might have been
confounded.

Forewarning should, according the experi-

menter's prediction, decrease a subject's persuasibility
by

allowing him to marshal arguments counter to those

'-thi.ch might be used in the persuasive message.

But dis-

tracting the subject 0 s attention from the message by
instructing him to concentrate on the speaker instead
of the message might have prevented the subject from
marshalling counter - arguments during the speech, thereby
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increasing his persuasibility.

A question of whether

the results were attributable to decreased persuasibility of

~~~ __
forewarned

group or the increased persua-

sibility of the distracted group had been raised.

The

distraction hypothesis was born.
Festinger and Maccoby (1964) took the view that most
of the result was due to distraction in the non-forewarned

group and constructed a series of three experiments
specifically designed to test the distraction effect.

A

simple obvious distraction was constructed into one of ·
two filmed persuasive communications.

In the non-dis-

tracting version, an edited comic film short accompanied
the same vocal persuasive communication.

The comic film,

it was hypothesized, would act as a distraction. breaking
up audience concentration on the speaker's message, attenuating counter argument and increasing persuasion .
In two experiments (University of Minnesota, San
Jose State College) only two experimental groups were

used.

A committed audience (they had taken action on

their attitudes) was exposed to a persuasive message
(Fraternity members heard arguments against Fraternities).
The message was delivered to one group via the distracting
film.

A second group viewed the non-distracting message.

In the third experiment (University of Southern California)
six conditions were tested.

Both Fraternity members and

Independents viewed the films.

A no message control group
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was added for each sample.
Although the

~anipulation

worked 1 the experiment

failed to indicate clearly why the distraction succeeded
in increasing persuasion.

Four explanations for the

success were advanced; of these, three were suggested
by the experimenters. · The first and strongest reasoning
was that the audience had indeed been distracted from
counter arguing.

But it remaimed possible that instead

of inhibiting counter arguing, the manipulation had

merely forced the audience to concentrate more intently
on the message.

Increased persuasion might, under these

circumstances, be attributable not to decreased counter
argument. but rather to increased comprehension, increased
learning, and ultimately, increased persuasion.

A third explanation was that the distraction, a
comic film, may have been an enjoyable one.

The audi-

ence's enjoyment of this distraction stimulus may have
been transferred to the message.

This transfer of posi-

tive feeling from the distraction to the message may have,
according to this explanation, served as a positive reinforcement aiding in the audience's acceptance of the
message.

A fourth explanation was offered by Rosenblatt (1966) o
He explained that the distraction may have served to dis-

guise the experiment as one testing comprehension of the
message.

Under this condition subjects might fail to
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suspect the message as a persuasive one and fail to
counter argue.
The traditional campfire, viewed with respect
to distraction, might then have become the horne of the
storyteller because it helped the story.
said to fascinate men.

Fire has been

If so, then a fire might, like

the film in the Festinger/Maccoby (1964) experiment,

have acted as a distraction stimulus, inhibiting an
audience's ability to counter argue.

A story told under

these circumstances might be more effective than the
same story told under other circumstances.
At least one observer would disagree with this view,
McGuire (1966), looking at the manipulation from the

persoective of ],.earning theory, suggests that distraction
should have the opposite effect, interfering with the
subject's comprehension of the message and attenuating
its persuasive effects.

You cannot, according to McGuire,

be persuaded by a communication that you don t fully
receive.

If McGuire's argument has a fault, it lies in his
assumption that a person cannot succeed in doing two
things at once.

If one is to accept McGuire's arguments

whole, then one is led to conclude that one cannot learn
a song from the radio when driving a car, understand a
lecture while taking notes on it, or comprehend a

friend~s

reasoning when an attractive member of the opposite sex
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passes by.

However, one excellent point stands out.

One cannot be persuaded when a communication is not
received.
Indeed, at least from the surface, the results of
the distraction experiments have not been at all conclusive.

Although experiments by Festinger and Maccoby

(1964), Freedman and Sears (1965), Rosenblatt (1966),
Kiesler and Mathog (1968, Osterhouse and Brock (1970),
Zimbardo, Thomas, Snyder, Gold, and Gewertz (1970) and
Keating and Brock (1974) have supported the distraction
hypothesis, studies by Haaland and Venkatesan (1968),
Silverman and Regula (1968) , Vohs and Garrett (1968),

Regan and Cheng (1973), Ware and Tucker (1974), and
Silverthorne and Mazmanian (1975) have failed to do so.
Search for an explanation for this inconclusiveness
in terms of selection bias yields little.

The experi-

ment measures relatively basic human responses, making

a selection bias difficult.

As yet, only one personali-

ty factor, intelligence, has even been suggested as a

relevant factor in the outcome of a distraction manipulation.

~~w

it might affect results is another question.

However, low intelligence may allow a subject fewer counter - arguments under all conditions, making him more susceptible to persuasion under any distraction condition.

In-

telligence subjects might, on the one hand, find themselves capable of counter argument and thus more

susc~p-
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tible to reduction of counter argument under distraction
conditions, but might also find themselves more capable
of

counter _ ~~guing

under multiple message conditions,

and therefore less susceptible to persuasion.

In any

case, until intelligence is experimentally manipulated,
no conclusions can be drawn.
I

Other methodological errors are also unlikely culprits.

The Festinger/Maccoby (1964) design is rather

simple.

It would take an effort to confound it.

The

hypothesis predicts that the distraction condition will
yield more persuasion than will the no distraction conditions.
these

Assuming random assignment, a comparison of

post-~est

results should yield the differing levels

of persuasion uder distraction and non-distraction conditions.

Thus only a post-test is necessary to obtain re-

sults.
The manipulation, like the testing, is rather spar-

tan.

~ne

needs only to obtain an effective persuasive

appeal, construct a distraction, and proceed.
as the

appe~~

As long

and other external factors are kept con-

stant for both distraction and non-distraction conditions, internal validity should be strong.

The simpli-

city of the manipulation along with the post-test only

design make this experimental model difficult to confound

and highly attractive to researchers.

In fact, except for
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the addition of· secondary manipulations and the varying
of distracting stimuli, this design has survived intact
in all but the most recent distraction manipulations.
In all fairness, distraction manipulations have
not been wholly free of methodological bias.

One con-

sistent research oversight in distraction experiments
has been the failure of several researchers to utilize
a no message control group.

While this oversight has

not really affected the experiments ability to test the
distraction hypothesis, such data might have proven
valuable in attempts to evaluate the results from other
perspectives.
But if the inconclusiveness of distraction research
cannot be blamed on methodology, to what can it be attributed?

One conclusion might be that the counter argument

distraction hypothesis as set forth by Festinger and
Maccoby (1964) is faulty.

Indeed, as noted above. several

alternative hypotheses have been formulated.

However,

none of these alternative hypotheses really do a better
job of explaining the results of distraction experiments
than doe·s the concept of reduced counter argumentation.
Festinger and Maccoby's (1964) suggestion that the
effect of the distraction stimulus of persuasion might
be due LO positive impact of the distraction stimulus

lost credence with Rosenblatt's (1966) manipulation.
Here

~istraction

was found effective in increasing the
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effectiveness of a persuasive message despite the
negative content (sets of slides drawn from dental
hygiene

and _ p~ychology)

of the distraction.

This hy-

pothesis failure has been confirmed several times since
in experiments using both negative and neutral distractions.
Rosenblatt (1966) himself suggested that distracted
subjects might not have the need to counter --argue
because the distraction disguised the experiment as a
comprehension test.

Some support is generated for this

hypothesis in his study's measure of suspicion of persuasive intent.

Suspicion was significantly reduced

among supjects exposed ·to distract ions.

Support, m.o re-

--

over, has been generated from ot_her sources.

Baron, ·

Baron, and Miller (1973) point out that lowered suspicion
of persuas1ve intent should increase source credibility
and cite several studies (Allyn & Festinger, 1961;
Festinger &.

·~1acc.o-by. ,:, _.

1.964·; c;nd

Haal~and. &

1968) where this effect was reported.

Venkatesan,

At best, however,

none of this support is strong. ·
It is difficult to find an experiment where suspicion
of persuasive intent cannot be in some way connected to
the distraction.

Experimental methods inevitably take

on the appearance of some kind of test, whether it be of
comprehension, coordination, or some other dependent vari-
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able.

However, in several experiments subjects have

been explicitly told that they were involved in a test
of cornprehensi9.n (Allyn &: Fest.inge·r,. ·t961;· Festinger .:-·: ·
& Maceo.by, . 1964·; · Rosenblatt , 1966; . Oste·r house &

Brock, 1970).

Being told that they would be tested on

the contents of the speech, it hardly seems probable
that distracted subjects would reduce counter argument

because the distraction disguised the experiment as a
test of comprehension.

It already was.

Indeed, non-

distracted subjects were as justified as distracted
subjects in reducing counter argument because persuasion
was not an important aspect of the proceedings.

All

these experiments nevertheless reported increased persuasion due to distraction.

Because of these results it

seems more reasonable to view suspicion of persuasive intent as a form of counter argument and to attribute re-

duced suspicion to reduced counter argument instead of
attributing reduced counter argument to reduced suspicion of persuasive intent.
A third explanation of how distractions act in increasing the persuasiveness of a message rotates around
the amount of effort expenditure necessary to overcome
the distraction.

It states that justifying the in-

creased effort necessary to understand a message under
conditions of distraction involves cognitive dissonance.
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Under dissonance theory as originally formulated this
would be a valid argument.

The unrewarded effort

would indee_d__be good reason to expect t hat dissonance
underlay the increased persuasion.

But this effort

involves no public and little personal commitment, thus
reducing the effect of dissonance both as it has come to
be

understood more recently, and as it will be presented

in Chapter 3.
Effort should not, however , be discarded as an _
element working to increase a subject's persuasibility
under conditions of distraction .

It has been consistently

shown that increasing the difficulty of obtaining a
given goal also increases the value the goal will have
upon attainment.
by

The classic study of this effect, done

Aronson and Mills (1959) demonstrated that subjects

who exerted great effort in order to join a group valued
the group more highly than those subjects whose effort
expenditure was mini.mal.

Although none of the surveyed

distraction experiments actually measured the effort e x pended by subjects in hearing the communication , it seems
safe to assume, pending confirmation, that it requires
more

~otal

effort to comprehend a message when distracted

than when undistracted.

This increased effort may evi-

dence itself in the upward re-valuing of the message by
distracted . subjects.
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It is this increased concentration on comprehending
the message that lies at the very root of the distraction
hypothesis._

~he

extra effor required to overcome the

distraction has to be drawn from other activities.
Counter argument appears to be important among the
activities seriously attenuated by this rechanneling of
available energy.
In this model increased effort is not seen as a
mechanism inducing cognitive dissonance.

Some dissonance

may be induced by an interaction of high effort and attitude discrepant message, but at best this would only
add to robustness of the distraction result.

The real

action of increasing effort to overcome a distracting
stimulus is that of attenuating the effort expended on
counter arguing.

Ultimately this action attenuates

counter argument and enhances persuasion.
It is readily apparent that this exploration of the
alternatives to Festinger and

~~ccoby's

(1964) primary

hypothesis of attenuated counter argument has led us
right back to that same hypothesis.

Counter argument,

however, at least on the surface, has proved to be less
than fully effective in predicting the effects of distraction on persuasion.
is no more successful.

McGuire's learning hypothesis
In fact, where results cannot

be explained by counter argument reduction, there is
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often evidence that learning has been attenuated.
Likewise. where no attenuation of learning is apparent,
counter

arg~ment

reduction finds ready support.

Brock (1967) developed a tool for measuring counter
arguments.

Keating and Brock (1974) and Zirnbardo et

al (1970) have used this tool successfully.

It

seems to correlate well with the level of persuasion,
demonstrating that distraction stimuli can botn reduce
counter argument and increase persuasion significantly.
Zimbardo et al (1970) was also able to show that at
least one class of distraction was capable of reducing
a subject's comprehension of a message, thus supporting
McGuire's learning hypothesis.
Thus, while there is evidence that distraction can
reduce counter argument and increase persuasion , there
is also evidence that it can reduce comprehension and
decrease persuasion.

Either position in the question

of what effect distraction has on persuasion can be
supported.

Experiments by Festinger and Maccoby (1964),

Rosenblatt (1966), and Keating and Brock (1974) support
increased persuasion due to distraction.

Vohs and Garrett

(1968) support decreased persuasion due to distraction.
Zimbardo et al (1970) supports both increased and decreased persuasion due to distraction.
and Sears (1965) supports neither.

Finally, Friedman
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Although the results of these studies are varied,
it seems apparent that there is a pattern to the success

and

failur~ ~L, these

manipulations.

Tests of the dis-

traction hypothesis have utilized a wide variety of
distracting stimuli.

Upon examination these stimuli

break down into several broad classes.

Three of these

classes involve stimuli irrelevant to the persuasive
communication.

These distractions can be described as

secondary and wholly separate messages.

They have no

real relation to the persuasive communication.

Another

three classes of distractions are composed of stimuli ·
relevant to the message.

Although they too may be con-

sidered separate messages, they are intrinsically··connected
to the persuasive communication.
Self-induced distractions provide the first and weaka
est category of irrelevant distraction stimuli.

This

type of distraction occurs when one concentrates on something other than the content of the message.

Examples of

this class of distr.action include evaluating the speaker's
non-verbal behavior, evaluating his sentence structure,
and concentrating on the speaker's personality.

The

latter of these was the flaw in the Allyn and Festinger

(1961) experiment and the subject of the Friedman and
Sears (1965) controlled replication.
Friedman and Sears (1965) is, logically speaking,
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the experiment that Festinger and Maccoby should have
run, providing a more direct test of their explanation
(distraction - ~rom

counter argument) of the Allyn and

Festinger (1961) experiment.

Ultimately, it is the ex-

periment that best demonstrates the power of the selfinduced distraction when operating alone.

Essentially,

the experiment is a controlled replication of Allyn and
Festinger (1961).

However, two hypotheses, one stating

that forewarning a subject of the topic of an impending
communication would decrease persuasion, and another
stating that concentrating on the personality of the
speaker rather than on the content of the message would
increase persuasion, were advanced.

Instead of two ex-

perimental groups, moreover, this manipulation utilized
five.

They included an unforewarned group who were

instructed to concentrate on the personality of the
speaker, a two minute warning group instructed to con- ·
centrate on the message, no warning and 10 minute warning groups instructed to concentrate on the message, and
a 10 minute warning group instructed to concentrate on
the personality of the speaker.
was utilized.

A pre-/post-test design

The results supported the warning hy-

pothesis (p<.02) but indicated only a trend for the distraction hypothes.is, (p<.lO).
The second class of irrelevant stimuli include camp-
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fires, out of sync audio/visual presentations, amplifier
feedback, and attractive members of the opposite sex.
These environmental stimuli are, in real life
beyond our control.

situat~ons,

Experimental examples of environ-

mental stimuli include the irrelevant films of Festinger
and Maccoby (1964), and Haaland and Venkatesan (1968),

the irrelevant slides of Rosenblatt ( 1966), the irrele.vant music of Regan and Cheng (1973), the flashing light
panels of Osterhouse and Brock (1970), and Keating and
Brock (1974), and the two digit list of Kiesler and
Mathog (1968).
The third class of irrelevant distraction can be
labeled evaluative stimuli.

In this type of distraction

the subject participates in some form of problem solving

while listening to a persuasive message.

Although, like

self-induced distractions, evaluative distractions center
on the evaluation of something other than the message,
the two classes are distinctly different.

Under self-

ind.u ced dis tract ion, at tent ion is directed somewhere
other than the message, but nothi·n g keeps it there.

Eval-

uative distraction in contrast, forces attention to a
second message.

This type of manipulation has been used

in experiments by Haaland and Venkatesan (1968), Vohs
and Garrett (1968), and Zimbardo et al • . (1970).
Relevant distractions differ from irrelevant dis-
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tractions in that the distractions relate directly to
the persuasive message.

The first class of these

relevant distractions, those that are intrinsic to the
persuasive presentation, make direct contribution to the
persuasive appeal.

These stimuli may evidence themselves

in charts, diagrams, pictures, cartoons, films and other
accessory materials that a speaker might use in reinforcing his arguments.

This class of relevant distrac-

tion, because of its close relation to the actual presentation, is probably the weakest of the relevant distraction stimuli.

In the absence of any hard data rele-

vant to the effect of this class of distraction, however,
this can only be speculated.
A second relevant class evidences itself in extrinsic
distractions, those relating directly to the message
but not intrins ic to the presentation.

These distrac-

tions include various forms of audience feedback (heck- ·
ling, laughter, and applause).

Research in the area of

extrinsic distractions has been limited thus far to the
effects of heckling (Ware & ·Tucker·, 1974 ;. and Silverthorne & MazmanianJ . 1975}, but can be expected to extend
to other areas9
Extrinsic distractions can be expected to break down
into two subclasses.

The research to date has been on

those extrinsic distractions which reflect negatively on

19

the communication.

These distractions (including heck-

ling and derisive laughter) act to point out counter
arguments to ·the. listener, effectively distracting the
subject from focusing on the speaker's persuasive
arguments and from his own consonant arguments.

The

result is the attenuation of persuasion and reduction
of speaker ethos (Ware & Tucker -,. 1974 f q.nd · Si lv·erthorne
& · Ma~mania~,

1975). ~

A second subclass of extrinsic distraction can be
expected to emerge, however, in those distractions (including cheering and applause) that reflect positively
on the communication.

Positive extrinsic distraction

should point out consonant arguments, focusing the
audience's atten·t ion on those arguments which are most
persuasive.

Under these conditions effort should be

distracted from counter argument to consonant argument.
A third class of relevant distraction, cognitive distractions, should serve to accentuate this effect.
Cognitive distractions are strongly related to selfinduced irrelevant distractions.

However, while self-

induced irrelevant distractions focus the subjects attention on a stimulus wholly unrelated to the message, cog-

nitive distractions involve focusing the subjects attention on how his approval of the message is dissonant with
his existing a·t titudes.

When confronted with a dissonant
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situation, the subject focuses his attention on resolving the dissonance.
arguing.

This distracts him from count.e r

The resulting attenuation of counter argument

enhances persuasion in the direction of the message,
thus resolving the dissonance.
' While cognitive distractions involve the same
mechanisms as the other classes of distractions, they
differ markedly.

The other five classes of distraction

involve an audience in behavior which distracts it from
counter arguing with a message from a persuasive other.
Cognitive distractions involve distracting a persuader
from counter-arguing with his own counter-attitudinal
message.

This principle difference not only acts to

differentiate these classes of distraction, but ties
distraction research to the already voluminous counterattitudin~l

Because of these differences

research.

it will be necessary to consider cognitive distractions

at some length.

This discussion will, however, be best

reserved until after

we

have considered a number of

issues related to audience distractions.

The six classes of distraction as presented divide
distraction research into related groups.
stimuli act to distract a
different way.
to a message.

subject~

While all the

each does so in a

Relevant distractions relate directly
Irrelevant distractions do not.

Self-
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induced distractions are imposed by, rather than on, a
subject.

Evaluative stimuli require the viewer to

solve problems; to make arguments not at all related to
the persuasive communication, while listening to that
communication.

While these classes relate to each other,

each has its own characteristics.

Each may. moreover,

affect counter argumentation differently.
Relevance represents the first of at least seven
factors which can affect the result of a distraction

manipulation.

The second of these factors, distraction

strength, was tested by Rosenblatt (1966).

Rosenblatt

hypothesized that ·distraction affected persuasion in a
curvilinear manner.

To test this he set up three dis-

tractions of various strengths.

He found that the

stronger the distraction was, the greater was theresulting attitude change.

Experiments by Osterhouse and

Brock (1970), and Keating and Brock (1974) have reconfirmed this finding and increased its strength by also
demonstrating that increases in distraction strength

decrease counter argument production.
There is evidence, however, that there is a limit
above which distraction strength decreases persuasion by

inhibiting an audience's ability to understand a message.
This distraction strength threshold takes control of
persuasion at that point when the bulk of the subject's
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effort is focused on the distraction.
the distraction becomes the message and
message becomes· the distraction.

At this point,
t~e

persuasive

This learning threshold

may account for the failure of two experiments, Vohs
and Garrett (1968) and Haaland and Venkatesan (1968).
These experiments used evaluative distractions, distractions which require an audience to construct argu(

ments irrelevant to the persuasive message.

Under these

circumstances, the distraction can easily become the
message. · Evidence for this threshold is refined in
Zimbardo and associates (1970).
Zimbardo and associates (1970) sought to manipulate
the effect of distraction strength by manipulating the
third factor, the subject's evaluative focus.

They there-

fore instructed their subjects to concentrate on either
the persuasive message, an evaluative distraction (math .
problems), or gave no instruction, leaving this last group
unfocused.

Subjects instructed to concentrate on the

message experienced similar levels of comprehension to
undistracted subjects, but experienced less counter argument and greater persuasion.

Subjects instructed to con-

centrate on the distraction and those distracted but left
unfocused, experienced lower levels of comprehension,
counter argument, and persuasion than the message focused
and undistracted subjects.

These findings support and

23
give direction to the concept of distraction strength,
particula~ly

as relates to evaluative distractions.

They show, moreover, the power of the otherwise weak
self-induced distraction, the class of distraction on
which evaluative focus centers, can have when they are
used in combination with other classes of distraction.
Message comolexity provides a fourth factor which
may affect the results of distraction manipulations.
Regan and Cheng (1973) used both simple and complex
messages in conjunction with a distraction

m~nipulation

to determine what effect message complexity would have
on both persuasion and the distraction effect.

Their

results indicate that distraction is most effective with
a simple persuasive message, becoming ineffective (actu-

ally reducing persuasion) when used with a complex
message.
The importance of effort in distraction is strongly
underlined by the concepts of evaluative focus, message
complexity, and distraction strength.

A concept formu-

lated by Cattell (1948) in his group syntality theory

may be useful in understanding just how effort operates
under these conditions.

Synergy, in Cattell's formu-

lation, is the sum of the individt1al energies brought to

a group by its members.

Personal energy in this formu-
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lation, refers to the sum of the energies which an
individual can allocate at any one time to a set of
tasks.
In this, as in Cattell's (1948), hypothesis, there
are two kinds of energy.

Maintenance energy is the

effort which is expended in the course of maintaining
personal harmony.

Effective energy is that energy

which is left for the achievement of the various goals
a person sets for himself.

It is to be assumed that all

available energy will be allocated at any given time.
When a person listens to a persuasive message, he
expends effective energy in the act of comprehending
the argument.

If the attitudes expressed are discrepant

with his own, he expends further energy in counter argu-

ing.

Distraction disrupts the balance by attacking a

person's cognitive harmony.

If the person is to continue

comprehending the incomi.ng information at the pre-distraction level, energy must be expended to overcome the
distraction, to maintain cognitive harmony.

But if all

personal energy is allocated, this expenditure requires
drawing on energy previously allocated to other projects.
As the distraction grows stronger, larger maintenance
energy expenditures become necessarye

Medium strength

environmental distractions cut into the counter argument
allocation, attenuating counter argument and enhancing
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persuasion.

Stronger evaluative distractions cut into

the energy expenditures for both counter argument and
learning, attenuating comprehension and persuasion.
If, however, attention is focused on the message, com-

prehension can be restored with an enhancement of persuasion.
A complex message is less likely to be comprehended
in the presence of distraction because more energy is
required for comprehension than would be required for a
simple message.

Thus when personal energy is re-allo-

cated in the effort to overcome the distraction, the

complex message is more quickly affected by energy loss.
The fifth factor which can affect the outcome of
a distraction manipulation is hardly a surprising one.
Communicator status appears to affect results in most
persuasive situations.
exception.

Distraction manipulations are no

Kiesler and Mathog (1968) tested this hypothe-

sis by attributing messages to either high or low credibility sources.
~ffective

They found that distraction was most

in increasing persuasiveness when the persuader

was highly credible.
Vohs and Garrett (1968) credit the failure of their
manipulation to lack of tooic familiarity.

They assert

t.hat their subjects might n.o t have been famt liar with
the topic of their persuasive appeal and therefore could
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not be expected to be able to counter argue successfully.
Although their results seem more likely a product of the
strength of their distraction, lack of topic familiarity
cannot be wholly rejected.

It cannot be expected that

distraction will attenuate counter argument if there
is none.

It should be recognized, however, that circum-

stances under which a subject would be unable to counter

a persuasive appeal are highly unusual.
Experiments testing the effects of heckling on
persuasion, (Ware

&.

Tucker·, .. l974.;· an·d · Silverthorne &

Mazmanian, 1975) have also failed to support the counter
argument hypothesis.

Message relevant stimuli like heck-

ling, applause, laughter, and silence can't really be
classified with irrelevant stimuli.

Irrelevant stimuli

act to discourage argument, but these stimuli may well act
to encourage ·argument.

Heckling should act to point out

the counter arguments to the persuasive message as conceived by the audience.

Indeed, at the very least it

should point out one counter argument, that the speaker's
beliefs are not shared by the audience.

The effects of

these arguments may be dependent, however, on a factor,
the subjective orientation of the distraction.

A posi-

tive stimuli like applause or a speaker's accessory materials should act to point out and encourage consonant
arguments , thus· increasing persuasion.
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These factors point the way to an explanation of
the inconsistant results reviewed earlier in this paper.
The hypothesis against which the results were gaged,
that of decreased argumentation

throug~

distraction,

although not incorrect, was not complete.

It was, ·

moreover set in competition with a learning hypothesis,
a hypothesis with which it may actually interact.
A reconciliation of Festinger and Maccoby's (1964)
distraction hypothesis with McGuire (1966) learning prediction facilitates the formulation of a more comprehensive set of distraction hypotheses.

The following two

hypotheses attempt to both reconcile counter argument
with learning and give consistency to the results of the
research to date.

Unlike many reconciling hypotheses,

most of which set limits on the scope and usefulness of
research, sometimes reducing results to the trivial,
this set of hypotheses seeks to broaden both the scope
and usefulness of distraction theory, at once setting
limits and opening horizons. _.
The first hypothesis states that irrele,tant distrac~tions

to a oersuasive message will act to inhibit counter

argumentation (provided. the subject is capable of counter

arguing) and increase persuasion.

Evaluative distractions

may also inhibit learning, with. a resulting decrease in
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persuasion.

This effect will evidence itself in a

curvilinear manner. with the curve based on strength
of distraction.

Distraction strength will interact

with the cornolexity of the message, the evaluative focus
of the audience, and the status of the speaker to determine
the apex of this curve.

Greater message comolexity will

be expected to reduce this threshold. beyond which both
counter argument and learning are attenuated and greater
focus on the message will both be expected to increase
this threshold.
The second hypothesis states that releyant distractions to a oersuasive message will act to encourage counter or consonant argument (provided the subject is capable of counter or consonant argument).

In doing so it

will differentially increase or decrease persuasion.

Ne~

ative relevant distractions will encourage counter arguments, decreasing persuasion.

Positive relevant distrac-

tions will encourage consonant arguments. increasing persuasion.
This explanation of the differential effects of relevant and irrelevant distractions on persuasion suggests
a new understanding of the ways in which people are persuad~d, . of

fire.

the workings of the storyteller and the camp-

The fire and the storytellers movements act as
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an environmental distraction.

The way in which he

manipulates the evaluative focus of the audience works
on the audience as a self-induced distraction.

Together,

these distractions act to attenuate counter argument and
enhance persuasion.

If the audience is responsive, they

may add the dimension of relevant distraction in their
responses, focusing attention, depending on the response,
on either consonant or counter arguments.

A warning,

moreover, to potential storytellers is implicit in the
observation that telling a story while the audience is
engaged in another activity may prove counter productive.
The effects of these various strengths of distraction seem relatively clear cut.

Less clear is the effect

distraction may have on the storyteller.
now turn our attention.

To this we

Chao~~~

III - Cogrritive Distraction

Cognitive distraction represents a significant
departure from the distractions discussed to now in
that -it involves the counter-attitudinal persuasion
paradigm.

Although experimenters involved in both

counter-attitudinal and distraction research have inferred some relationship between these areas of interest,
this relationship has not been specified.
Festinger and Maccoby's (1964) effort hypothesis,
which was discussed in Chapter 2, used cognitive

disso ~

nance as a secondary explanation for observed distraction.

Baron (1973), in an attempt to bolster this same

effort hypothesis, uses an example from dissonance research (Zirnbardo, 1963),

The effort hypothesis states

that distraction can cause dissonance because the expenditure of energy to hear a persuasive message might
require justification.

As noted, however, this expendi-

ture, being private, would involve neither public nor
private commitment to the message.

Under such circum- ·

stances, it could hardly be expected that a
of dissonance would be aroused.

gre~t

It is possible,

deal
~owever,

to take the opposite view, that dissonance causes, and i n

effect is a distraction.

Our purpose here will be to show
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that dissonance can cause distraction.
Counter-attitudinal advocacy has been examined
from a variety of perspectives, two of which, the dissonance and incentive interpretations, remain at the
center of critical debate.

The dissonance perspective

claims that persuasion in counter-attitudinal situations
is the result of dissonance, a recognition that one's
actions are not congruent with one's attitudes.

Theo-

retically, when one feels dissonance, an unpleasant experience, one will attempt to justify one's actions,
to reduce that dissonance by whatever means are available.
Counter-attitudinal advocacy, in this· perspective, is a

dis sonant situation.

The subject, having agreed to en-

code a message which is contrary to his won feelings,

feels, and must resolve, dissonance.

One of the most

important potential outlets for resolving the dissonance

is attitude change.
Incentive theorists take a different perspective,
claiming that persuasion in the counter-attitudinal situation varies with the incentive· the individual has to

encode the counter-attitudinal message.

Positive in-

centives, good reasons for encoding the message, cause
the individual to concentrate on the consonant arguments
he is encoding and suppress arguments which are counter
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to those he is encoding.

This process i ·s called biased

scanning, the method by which the attitude is modified.

The difference between these two perspectives is
fundamental.

One perspective says that persuasion

results from accumulated unresolved bad feelings (dissonance).

The other says that persuasion results from

accumulated good feelings (incentive).

The result has

been a series of conflicting predictions.

Dissonance

theorists (Festinger & Carlsmitr.h, 1959; Brehm & Cohen,. : ... .
1962; Carlsrnith, Collins, & Helmrich, ·1966) have pre- ·-

dieted and confirmed that paying subjects small amounts
of money (low reward) produced more attitude change than

large amounts of money (high reward).
(Rosenberg, 1965; Carlsmith, Collins,

Incentive theorists
&

Helrnrich, - 1966) ·

countered by predicting and confirming that high reward
produced

mor~

attitude change than low reward.

Incentive theorists had also predicted and confirmed
an effect for source credibility.

Elms and Janis (1963)

and Janis and Gilmore (1965) hypothesized that counterattitudinal essays written for a positive sponsor (low
dissonance sponsor) would engender greater attitude change
than essays written for a negative (high dissonance)
sponsor.

The hypothesis was confirmed.

Under slightly

different circumstances, the opposite effect has also
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been shown.

Zimbardo, Weisenberg, Firestone. and Levy
attitud- ~

(1965) found that subjects engaged in a counter

inal activity ·(eating grasshoppers) experienced more
attitude change (persuasion) when offered the grasshoppers by an unpleasant (negative) person than by a
pleasant one.

This persuasion did not result from the

actual encoding, by the general principle, that action
x is contrasted with attitude not x, remains the same,
leaving the influence of source credibility unresolved.
This confusion of results intensifies upon examination
of several later studies (Helmrieh

& Collins, 1968;

Linder, Cooper, & ·Jones,. ·1967;.· and · .Burgoon·-,. Miller , &
Tubbs, 1972) in which both incentive and dissonance predictions are supported.

In the midst of this range of

results, only one hypothesis remains clearly supported,
that the counter-attitudinal encoding situation engenders
attitude change in the direction of the message.

Through-

out the research, even where the attitude change has not
been significant, some movement in the direction of the
message has been demonstrated.

Although this movement

has not always been significantly different from no
message control conditions, the consistency of this movement suggests that it is meaningful.

Indeed this hypothe-

sis need not be limited to counter-attitudinal

advocacy~
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Consonant argument encoding has been shown not only
capable of consonant persuasion, but subject to the
same effects of reward that are observed in the dissonant encoding situation (Nuttin, 1966; Kiesler & ·
Sakamtira, 1966).
The resulting hypothesis, that any attitude encoding situation engenders some attitude change in the
direction of argument, bears closer examination, especially as it is subject to neither dissonance nor incentive predictions.

At first glance the hypothesLs

seems a reasonable prediction of self-perception theory
(Bern, 1965, 1968).
behavior.

Attitude does appear to follow from

Although self-perception theory offers a

process by which attitude change should occur, logical
i nference from the context of the behavior, there appears
to be no way in which this logical inference can be
measured.

Indeed, this process is so broad as to defy

usefulness, for what, whether it be status, dissonance,
incentive, or room color is not a part of a behavior
context.
A more promising explanation comes from the comprehensive theory of distraction presented in chapter one.
In this model, the act of concentrating on the construction of a message serves as a self-induced distraction
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which attenuates counter argument.

Although the

effec~,

as is to be expected from self-induced distractions,
is a weak one, the increase in persuasion can be expected
to approach and eve·n occasionally achieve conventional
significance levels.

The question here is, of course,

not of significance, but of meaningfulness.

Most experi-

ments in counter-attitudinal advocacy engage forty to
fifty subjects.

Samples of this size, while generally

sufficient to the task of preventing spurious significance are not generally sufficient to the task of preventing spurious non-significance.

It can therefore be

expected that as sample size decreases, the likelihood
of assigning statistical significance to a weak, yet
potentially meaningful effect will also decrease.
It should be noted that some similarity exists
between this formulation and the incentive concept of
biased scanning (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley,. 1953) • . The
biased scanning hypothesis states that the counterattitudinal encoder focuses on consonant arguments and
suppresses counter-arguments.

The distraction hypothe-

sis doesn't assume an expenditure of effort in the act
of suppressing counter-arguments.

Instead, it states that

the act of encoding distracts the encoder from counter argument, that the re-allocation of energy made necessary
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by the act of encoding draws energy that would otherwise

be used in

counter ~ arguing.

In the absence of strong

counter argument, the individual is persuaded.
The hypothesis that any attitude encoding situation
will engender some attitude change in the direction of
argument, while clearly the most supportable among the
available explanations for persuasion in the counterattitudinal encoding situation, does little to explain the
differing levels of persuasion observed in the research.
Efforts to reconcile the differing predictions and results made and obtained by dissonance and incentive
theorists has shifted from attempts to disconfirm the
perspectives to the task of finding mediating variables.
Perhaps the most promising research in this area
involves the manipulation of choice.

The concept that

the amount of choice an individual feels in deciding to
counter-attitudinally encode might be important in de t er mining the level of persuasion comes from the dissonance
perspective.

It was hypothesized that manipulating the

degree of choice, would vary the level of dissonance felt
by the individual.

Low pressures for compliance would

make the decision to encode counter-attitudinally highly
dissonant.
dissonance.

High pressure to encode would reduce that

37
Essential to this prediction is acceptance of the
hypothesis (Festinger, 1967) that an individual acting
in a dissonant situation (a situation where action x is
contrasted by belief not x), will attempt to reduce that
dissonance.

The concept is an appealing one.

People

who don't act on their convictions are supposed to feel
both the discrepancy and some remorse.

Nevertheless,

there is evidence that dissonance is not a universal

phenomena.

Burgoon, Miller, and Tubbs (1972) hypothesized

that people who enjoy manipulating others would not feel
dissonance in the counter-attitudinal encoding situation.
To test this prediction they measured Machiavellianism
(Christy & : Geis·;

, ~970). a measure ·of this -'. rnanipulat~ve :

tendency, and gave subjects the opportunity to counterattitudinally encode under varying magnitudes of reward.
The results supported the prediction.

Low reward, low

machiavellians were significantly more persuaded than
any other group.

High reward and high rnachiavellian con-

ditions experienced similar levels of persuasion in relation to the no message control condition.
This study stands as compelling evidence for the
dissonance approach.

However, it also demonstrates that

the dissonance approach has some definable limitations.
The hypo·t hesis that an individual wl-10 feels dissonance
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when acting in a dissonant situation will attempt to
reduce that dissonance is, therefore, more acceptable.

If an individual can feel dissonance it is conceivable that the magnitude of that dissonance can be manipulated.

Among the factors capable of affecting dissonance

is pressure for compliance.

Linder, Cooper, and Jones

(1967) ran two experiments to test this hypothesis.
the first experiment a 2 x 3 design was utilized.

In
Three

levels of monetary payment were used to test the .dissonance monetary prediction with two levels of pressure for
compliance.

High pressure subjects were assumed, as

volunteers in the experiment, to be willing to counterattitudinally encode, even though they had
without knowledge of the task.

vo~unteered

Low pressure subjects

were informed of the counter-attitudinal task and asked
if they would be willing to encode the message.

If a

subject refused, he was not pressed to participate.

The

hypothesis, that high choice subject-s· would be persuaded
according to the dissonance monetary prediction and low
choice subjects persuaded according to the incentive prediction, was supported.
The second experiment attempted to explore how narrow
a range of compliance pressure might produce this effect.
The manipulation, a controlled replication of Rosenberg
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(1965), demonstrated that the difference between high and
low pressure for compliance need not be at all large.
Subjects in all experimental groups, after blindly volunteering to participate

~n

the experiment were told that

the task they would be asked to complete was totally
voluntary and they didn't have to participate.

How-

ever, $.50 ($2.50) would be paid the subjects i.f they
would encode a counter-attitudinal message.

High pres-

sure for compliance was induced by moving the subjects
directly into the task of counter-attitudinally encoding.
Subjects in the low pressure groups were, however, asked
once more if they would be willing to encode before
starting the task.

The results, although less robust

t han those in the first experiment, demonstrate that even
this small difference in compliance pressure can induce
persuasion corresponding to both dissonance (in low presure conditions) and incentive (in high pressure conditions) predictions.
It should be clear, on the basis of the Linder,
Cooper, and Jones (1967) manipulations, that pressure for
compliance serves as a mediating variable between the
dissonance and incentive predictions.

However, a hypothe-

sis stating that the effect of monetary incentives varies
with amount of pressure for compliance would be premature.
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Early dissonance research indicated that the mode of
counter-attitudinal encoding might mediate between predictions.

The original Festinger and Carlsmith .(1959)

dissonance manipulation was a role play.

Incentive

predictions had been confirmed using essay writing (Elms
& · Ja.nis~ :·, l963 . i

Ja.n is : & G.i ·lrnore·, 1965). · .Although·:,=

Cohen's (1962) essay results had supported the dissonance
prediction, a replication by Rosenberg (1965) had supported the incentive prediction.
Carlsmith, Collins, and Helmrich (1966) made a
specific test of this hypothesis in a replication of
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959).

After completion of the

dull task subjects were asked to counter-attitudina l ly
encode in either a face to face role play situation or
a n essay writing condition.

As expected, role pl ayers

were persuaded according to dissonance predictions while
e ssay writers were persuaded as incentive predicted .
These results indicated that essay writing and role playi ng had differing effects on persuasion in the countera ttitudinal encoding situation.

Later experiments show these effects to be anything
but clear cut.

Helmrich and Collins (1968) used high

pressure for compliance in all conditions as they demon-

s trated that varyi.ng the extent to v1hich the subject wa.s
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identified with his role play message could produce a
dissonance effect in the high identification (videotape) condition.

The low identification (anonymous

audio-tape recording) condition experienced an incentive
effect.

Linder, Cooper, and Jones (1967) only used the

essay condition in demonstrating the effects of pressure
for compliance.
Individually, neither pressure for compliance nor
encoding condition fully explain the effects of counterattitudinal message encoding.

However, it is possible

to view both as affecting the level of commitment the

encoder brings to the message.

Low pressure for com-

pliance lays the decision t .o encode on the encoder.
cannot lay the blame elsewhere.
of his own free will.

He

He has committed himself

Similarly, role playing makes the

act of encoding public, and as the amount of evidence
as to who the encoder is increases, his ability to deny
that message decreases.

The greater public commitment

of the role play condition over the essay condition or
even the anonymous tape recorder condition increases the
encoder's commitment to what he has said.
This action of commitment has evidenced itself in
experiments to date as an interaction.

In low commitment

situations (high pressure for compliance experiments
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utilizing reasonably anonymous encoding techniques)
persuasion has conformed to incentive predictions (Elms
&: ~ Janis, 1963 ·; I;{osenberg.- 1965; .Carlsrnith, .. c;ollins
& . .Helmrich·, 1966;- Lindner, ~ Cooper, &. Jortes, _l967; and

He1mrich & Co·llins, 1968). -~. In high commitment s.itua•:· --

tions (those utilizing low pressure for compliance and/
or public encoding techniques) persuasion has conformed
to dissonance predictions (Festinger & Carlsmith,·l959; ·.
Cohen, 1962; Carlsmith, Collins, & Helm:tich;.· l966:···.·.:
Lindner, Cooper et. Jones ·.l967;· ar:td Helmrich ·. &,_ ,Collins, ';
1968) for those who felt d.issonance (Burgoon, Miller,
&· ·T t.ibb s .,

· J_ 9 7 2 ) •

Increasing commitment to a counter-attitudinal message should make the disparity between attitude and

advocacy more salient, increasing dissonance.

Decreasing

commitment to that message makes the disparity less
salient, decreasing dissonance.

On the basis of this, a

series of hypotheses can be generated.
The first hypothesis states that decreasing the level

of encoder anonymity associa·ted with the counter-atti-

tudinal task will increase the degree of personal commitment.

The second, that decreasing the oressure for com-

pliance will increase · the degree of personal commitment.
Third, that in lo~-.r commitment situations, the oerson who
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feels dissonance will be able to reduce that dissonance
without ad justm~nts_ in attitude.

Fourth, that as the

degree of commitment increases, dissonance. if felt,
will increase.
Little presented in this chapter to this point
represents a particularly new perspective on either distraction or counter-attitudinal advocacy.

Most of the

concepts forwarded are common knowledge to communications
researchers.

It has been my intention to present these

concepts in a usable framework, rather than in the piecemeal fashion in which they are usually presented, in
order to make the relationship between the dissonance
and incentive predictions clear.

This accomplished, it

would be helpful to explore the nature of this relationship more fully.
Viewing degree of commitment as the key to dissonance
induction makes it possible to look at the high and low
monetary payments that are common to counter-attitudinal
research not as rewards or incentives, but rather as a
type of pressure for compliance.

Amounts of monetary

reward considered barely sufficient to the task could not
be expected to exert much pressure on the subject in mak-

ing his decision to encode.

But as the reward increased
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the promise of payment could be regarded as a greater
and greater

rea~~~L

greater and greater pressure to

comply with the request of the experimenter.

Where the

existing pressures to encode are small, the pressure

induced by increasing the monetary reward could have a
substantial effect in reducing personal commitment to
the message and attenuating the level of persuasion.
Where, on the other hand, the existing pressures

for

compliance are already large, the size of the reward
would not be expected · to affect the already attenuated
commitment to the message in the same way it would were
the existing pressures smaller.
This approach helps clarify the results of monetary
manipulations in counter-attitudinal advocacy manipulations.

Festinger and Carlsmith (1959), in a manipulation

where verbal,pressure for compliance was small, found that
small rewards enhanced persuasion to a greater extent
than did large reward.

Janis and Gilmore, in an experi-

ment where pressure for compliance was large (and subject
decision freedom small) found little difference between
~onetary

conditions.

The comparative results of these

two experiments appears in Figure 1.

These results are

'.

~emarkably

similar to those presented in Llndner, Cooper,
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and Jones (1967), Collins and Helmrich (1968), and Burgoon, Miller, and Tubbs (1972).
Taken together, this evidence underlines a corollary
to the set of hypothesis just presented.

Increasing

levels of reward for counter-attitudinal encoding will
increase pressure for compliance and decrease dissonance.
A second corollary hypothesis, that monetary rewards
will be minimally effective under conditions of existing
low commitment, can be inferred, but lacking more evidence any such hypothesis would be premature.
This second hypothesis would be a serious challenge
to the incentive hypothesis.

Although Janis and Gilmore

(1965) felt no predictions about the effects of reward
could be made based on incentive theory, a series of
experimenters have predicted, based on incentive formulations, that high reward subjects would be more persuaded
in counter-attitudinal encoding situations than low reward encoders.

Experimental evidence has consistently

supported this incentive effect, although the effect has
been strong in only two experiments.

These exceptions, Rosenberg (1965) and Carlsmith,
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Collins, and. Helmrich (1966), seem worthy of closer
exarninat ion.

The exper.iments share a common aspect in

their use of a disguised post-test measure.

Although

use of a disguised post-test should enhance the validity
of experimental results, there is some evidence that in

the Carlsrnith, Collins, and Helmrich ·e xperiment, it
acted as an intervening variable, skewing the results in
the direction of high reward.

were exposed to a dull task.

In the experiment subjects

At the completion of the

t ask they were asked to encode a message to the effect
t hat the task was enjoyable.

The manipulation was two-

f old, with subjects either offered a high or low reward,
a nd asked to encode either actively (to a prospective
s ubject) or passively (in an essay).

Subjects were then

t old that another experiment was in progress nearby.

The

s econd experiment was really nothing more than a well
d isguised post-test in which the experimenter , after
s howing . the subjects how the experiment worked, professed
that he, although knowing very little about the experiment
t hey had just left, needed to get their reactions to
task they had been involved in.

the

Between the task and the

post-measure, however, another test of sorts had occurred
in the act of counter-attitudinal encoding.

As such, the

post-test was not a measure of reaction to the dull task,
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but rather to the entire experiment.

It seems to me that

if I had been asked by an experimenter to evaluate a test
that had been given to me by another set of experimenters,
I would respond in terms of everything the experimenters

had asked me to do, not just the first part of an experiment which the questioner professed to knowing little
about.

I think, moreover, that I would respond more

positively to the act of writing an essay if I earned more
money for doing so.

Although this post-test flaw by no

means invalidates the experiment, I do believe that it
has skewed the results toward the high reward condition.
The result is a set of overly high essay condition
means and somewhat low role play condition means.
The post-test is probably not responsible for the
results of the Rosenberg (1965) manipulation.

Here the

experiment may have been confounded by the instructions.
These instructions, given by experimenter 1, described
experimenter 2 (who was to offer money for encoding) negatively.

Because of this, it seems possible that the poor

status of the experimenter may have been attenuated by
the high reward condition and accentuated in the low reward condition.
Status predictions are, of course, central to the
incentive hypothesis.

But status is an accepted enhancer
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of persuasion and there is no apparent reason why .a
high status sponsor shouldn't enhance the credibility
of his position for an audience.

This view invalidates

attempts to predict sponsorship effects according to
either dissonance or incentive predictions.

Generally

speaking, high status can be expected to enhance the
attractiveness of the sponsor's viewpoint. just as it enhances the attractiveness of a speaker's viewpoint.
The prediction raises the question of why this status
doesn't counterbalance the effect of dissonance, with high
reward enhancing status and persuasion sufficiently to
counter-balance the effect of dissonance in the low reward condition.

Examination of the source credibility

phenomenon yields an interesting answer to this question.
In chapter 1, three types of message relevant distractions
were introduced, one of which, extrinsic distraction,
?

involved focusing an audience's attention on either consonant · (in the positive condition) or counter (in the negative .condition) arguments.

Source credibility may cause

a focusing of attention on positive or negative attributes of the speaker, rather than on message.
s~urce

As such,

credibility may act as an extrinsic distraction,

accentuating either consonant or counter argument.

How-
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ever, while positive credibility can be expected to
enhance consonant argument and negative credibility
can be expected to enhance counter argument, the dual
effect of the cognitive dissonance/distraction process
in enhancing consonant and attenuating counter argument
should be more than a match for credibility.

If, for

instance, counter argument is already attenuated under
the distracting influence of dissonance, how effective
can the additional counter arguments of low sponsor
credibility be, except perhaps to increase personal
commitment and distraction.

How much can positive source

credibility add to already heightened consonant arguments.
This leads naturally into another hypothesis.

Where

dissonance is resolved, communication is subject to the
usual persuasion variables, including soonsor credibility.
This hypothesis effectively subordinates the entire incentive perspective to dissonance and distraction predictions.

In Rosenberg (1965) pressure for compliance

removed the effect of dissonance.

In its absence, high

reward was able to raise the status of the experimenter/
sponsor~

with a consequent increase in influence.

High

reward, in this case, became effective not because of the
power of the incentive, but rather because dissonance was
r.esolved before money er1tered tr1e picture.

From this per-

so
spective, his results are remarkably consistant with
Elms and Janis (1963) and Janis and Gilmore (1965).
This hypothes-is leads us to the heart of the chapter.
Cognitive dissonance, while a powerful explanation for
the persuasion process is, like gravity, difficult to
prove extent.

Falling, when the laws of gravity say we

should, is no better a proof of gravity than being persuaded, when dissonance predicts we should be, is a
proof of dissonance.

The problem involved with under-

standing gravity is that we don't fully understand the
processes involved.

Once that same problem inhibited our

understanding of fire.

In point of fact, fire was once

considered, as gravity and persuasion are now, to be something that just happened, as a basic element of the system in which we live.

Now, of course, we know that fire

is the result of combustion, a process of molecular re-

arrangement, but gravity, and to a greater extent, cognitive dissonance, remain mysteries, elements of life
for which we fail to understand the process, the method
of combustion.
The following hypothesis is an attempt to define
the process of cognitive dissonance.

If successful, it

may serve as support for the dissonance hypothesis.

In

situations where dissonance is not reduced, oeoole will
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be distracted by that dissonance from counter arguing
with their counter-attitudinal message and ,.,ill be per-

suaded.

This persuasion will. in turn, reduce the dis-

sonance. reduce the distraction, and. ultimately , slow
the process of oersuasion.

This process, which is called

cognitive distraction, has the potential of extreme power
because it is a focused evaluative distraction resulting
f rom a direct, self-induced attack on our own cognitive system.

Together, these hypotheses describe a system in
which persuasion can occur.

Many of the hypotheses wh ich

fo rm this system are the results of work of the res earchers from whose work the entire system was drawn
and demonstrated.
hy potheses.

The system is made possible by three

The first is the refinement of .the concept

of public commitment , what is sometimes called new dis s onance theory, to that of personal commitment , of which
public commitment can be a cause.

The second is the

r ecognition that source credibility is not an unusual pe r s uasion variable and the specification that such standard
p~rsuasion

variables can only be effective where dis-

s onance has been resolved.

The third and most important

i s the demonstration that distraction and dissonance are
s trongly interrelated.

This allowed counter-attitudinal
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advocacy results is to be viewed in relation to results
in other research traditions a task which had, in the
past, been made difficult by the seeming discrepancies
of counter-attitudinal results with those of other
traditions.

Of the hypotheses presented in this chapter,

only these hypotheses (and those that follow directly
from them) are mine,

The hypotheses on which these are

built belong to the studies which d.emonstrated them.

With the system of distraction described in my chapter
two hypotheses, cognitive distraction can be built into
a greater whole.
chapter.

This whole is the subject of the next

Chapter

IV~~

Model of the Persuasive Process

The hypotheses generated in chapters 2 and. 3
suggest a model of the persuasive process.

It is a

tentative model, and a large number of variables could
not be considered in its formulation.

Many variables re-

lating to two of the more important research d isciplines
in persuasion, distraction and counter-attitudinal
advocacy, have, however, been reviewed in some depth.
Formalizing the persuasive model in which these variables
operate may be useful in clarifying their interaction.
At the basis of any such persuasive model is the
process of persuasion.

Part of this process, an action

involving message counter and message consonant argument,
has been implicit in our discussion of both distraction
and dissonance.

In this basic model, persuasion is

caused by maximizing message consonant argument and mini .....
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mizing message counter argument in the persuadee.

Thus

in the basic model, depicted in Figure 2, the connections
from message counter and consonant argument to persuasion
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indicate that argument influences persuasion, that
persuasion can be predicted from argument.
Irrelevant distraction, according to the hypotheses of chapter 2 ,.

· ~nhances

message counter argument.

perscras ion by . reduc in·g

Relevant distraction does so

by enhancing either message counter argument (with

negative relevant distractions) or message consonant
argument (with positive relevant distractions).

Cog-

nitive dissonance, according to the traditional interpretation, induces persuasion by forcing the subject to
justify his actions, if by no other means, than by
finding good reasons, such as message consonant arguments, for the act ion.

The chapter

3~

view · of.. cog·- · .'·

-~

nitive dissonance states that this act of finding good
reasons drains energy that might otherwise be used for
counter - argument, allowing cognitive distraction to occur .

In this sense, dissonance may be an optimal instrument
of persuasion insofar as it both maximizes consonant
argument by forcing the persuadee to look for good rea • .
sons for his actions and minimizes counter argument by
distracting the subject from counter argument.
It is believed that this basic model provides a
reasonable . process through which distraction and dissonance can operate in enhancing the persuasive process.
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The model also works in explaining other aspects of the
persuasive· process.

Inoculation theory, for example,

predicts that giving a persuadee material and motivation
will bolster his ability to counter argue with a message.
This concept of counter argument bolstering is extremely
consistent with the model.

So too is McGuire's (1964)

·finding that supplying a persuadee with the material
and motivation necessary to counter argue is effective
in reducing persuasion.
The model is also effective in explaining findings
showing that one sided persuasive messages can be more
effective than two sided persuasive messages.

One sided

messages present only message consonant arguments while
two sided messages also provide, even when presented in
refutational context, message counter arguments.

The

superiority of emotional persuasive messages over logical
ones is also implicit in this model.

The

poss~bility

of

another viewpoint is implicit to logical argument, but
is

~arely

admitted in the emotional appeal.

Finally, the model explains persuasion decay over
time.

If, indeed, persuasion is the result of increased

message consonant and/or decreased message counter argu-

.ment, then persuasion can be said to result from an imbalance between counter and consonant

argument~

It

56

should be expected that, while an imbalance of this sort
should be easy to maintain for short periods, _ the sub-- -

jects cognitive balance should be restored , over a period
of time.

This may evidence itself in two ways.

First,

consonant arguments may be rejected or forgotten, resuiting in a reduction in persuasion.

Persuasion should

also be reduced when counter argument increases.

This

should make persuasion due to distraction particularly
vulnerable to reduction over time.
It would appear that this basic model is reasonably

parsimonious with a variety of approaches to the persua-

sive process.

In communication research, however, per-

suasion is rarely treated directly as a dependent measure.
It is instead implied through the differences in the final
attitudes of experimental groups.

This implies a second

segment in our basic persuasive model.

This segment,

depicted in Figure 3, represents the most basic predic..J.
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t .ion of the persuasive process, that final attitude is the

sum of initial attitude and persuasion.

This prediction

is rather obvious and stands, in this study as an operational definition.

Its purpose in the model is not, as
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will be the case in the rest of the model, that of showing how persuasion can be influenced, but rather to
act as a reminder - tnat persuasion represents a change
in attitude.

Implicit to this reminder is an implied

feedback loop between initial and final attitude.

In -

fact; the only aspect of the two that allows separation
is the fact that attitudes can change over a period of
time.

Given this basic model, it becomes possible to depict the ways in which attitude can be affected through
persuasion.

The first major area of influence comes from

what might be called standard persuasion variables.
These variables are standard, first, because they have an
effect in almost every persuasive situation and, second,
because they belong .to ·no ·specific theory of persuasion.
These variables, as depicted in Figure 4, a:t;fect p·e r• ·. :suasion through their effect on message counter and consonant argument.

First among these variables is source credibility.
~ource
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as a . distraction, affecting either counter or consonant
argument.

Generally speaking, increased credibility

should increase message consonant argument while decreased credibility should increase message counter argument.
A second important variable is learning.

Learning

involves the process of obtaining message counter and
consonant arguments.

As, however, the principal com-

ponent of a persuasive message is consonant argument,
learning, during a persuasive message, usually involves
only consonant argument.

Learning is, in turn, affected

by a variety of variables, only one of which, message
complexity, is distinct enough from the variables yet
to be presented to allow inclusion as a standard variable.
Generally, increasing message complexity should reduce
learning and consonant argument.
Message complexity leads naturally into the distraction variables, especially since
can have a profound effect, as
learning.

stronge~ : distractions

not~d

in chapter 2 ,. on

Distraction strength is, in fact, the most

important of the distraction variables.

The stronger the

distraction the more acute its effect in attenuating first
counter argument and then learning.

In Figure 5 this ·
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effect is shown by the connections between these variables.

It should be noted, however, as was pointed out

in chapter 2 ·.that ·the ;·ef·f e·ct ·:on ·learning ·. L.s ·: not -·.

major except for the strongest class of distractions.
Evaluative focus can be an effective weapon in reducing the effect stronger distractions can have on learning.

As such, its effect is not on counter argument, b·ut

rather on learning.

For this reason,- evaluative focus

is shown influencing learning in the model.
influence counter

argume~t

Focus may

also, in weaker distractions,

but there is, at present, no evidence to support that

contention.
The third variable in the distraction group, relevance, notes that distractions which are related to the
message have different characteristics than those which
are .not.

Relevant distractions can bolster either message

counter or consonant argument..

This is shown in the

model, but it should be remembered that relevant distractions can only bolster one or the other, not both, at
any given time.
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Although only three variables have been directly
attributed to distraction in the model, it should be
remembered that

tw~

of the standard variables, source

(sponsor) credibility and message complexity, have an
Another factor

impact on the process of dis tract ·_on.

that affects distraction, cognitive dissonancej
a set of

in and cf itself.

var~ables

~nvolves

Figure 6 depicts

the central variables in the cognitive dissonance
process.

As a group these variables affect d1ssonance

by varying personal commitment.

The first of these variables, personalit)r, car not
be said to be entirely unique to the dis so11ance process •
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however, important, especial-

where Macl1iave 11 ian ism is concer11ed.

As was noted in

chapter 3, . ·people .who score ·hi-gh l.J} . Machtavelian.:.

·

isrn often fai 1 to e·vidence d issor1ance in the counterattitudinal. framework.

1'hus, personalit:y plays a critical

role in the dissonance process.
Less ambiguous in their relationship to disson.arlce
are th,e variables choice and reward.

Of t:he two choice

may be· t:he n1ore important, for lew levels of choice pro-

vide an easy and immediate avenue for non-atti udinal
dissonance reduct ion.

High choice levels, on the o·ther
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hand, force responsibility on the subject, allowing
him no one to blame for h1s actions but himself.
Reward affects dissonance, in a sense, by manipulating
choice.

A high reward should prove more lucrative to

a subject, harder to refuse, than a low reward.

High

reward also provides its own outlet for dissonance reduction, for counter-attitudinal behavior can be justified in terms of the high reward.
Although less important than the preceding varia-

bles, anonymity can also affect dissonance.

A person

faced with encoding a message that will never be heard
by

anyone else, or with which he will never be associ-

ated, should be expected to care less about what is
said than would a person who can be identified as the
speaker and who knows his message will be . used to influ-

ence others.
dissonance.

Thus anonymity can be expected to affect
Indeed, several of the experiments described

in chapter '3:. have .s·how.n ..just _. such . an... e.f .f ect ·•.
It is important to note that each of the dissonance

variables affects dissonance, either increasing it or
decreasing it.

Dissonance in turn affects message con-

sonant and counter argument.

The effect of dissonance

in increasing message consonant argument is related to
the original theory of cognitive dissonance.

It is,

in fact, the attempt to jusLify the dissonant behavior.
The effect of dissonance in decreasing message counter

. 62
arg 1 rnents~

on the other

hand~

io related to distraction.

In a very real sense, the effecc
prove important,

_ i~

although expected to

secor1darv tn the other d · ssonan.ce

variables, for cognitive distractions are caused by the
rechanneling of energy into the act of jJstifying behavior.

The rechanneling is caused by the dissonance

which, in the end, is the product of the dissonance
variables.
Other variables also play a role in the dissonance
process.

Of particular importance is attitude.

A

message must be at least somewhat counter-attitt1di11al

in order to arouse dissonance.

Moreover, as the pro-

cess of dissonance begins to affect attitude, the -attitude change also af.lects d.;..ssonan'"'e.
process, althoug

Th .. s feedback

an tnlportan.t disso·n ance predict ion,

cannot be depicted in thB model and is, from a practical
standpoint ·, a difficult prediction to measure.
Togetl1er, the several rnodels presented in this

chapter form a larger model of the persuasive process.
This larger model, shown in Figure

7 ~

is really nothing

more than an ordered combination of tl1e several small

models.

The explanation offered for each of these models

should, tl1erefore, hold true.

The purpose of ·the model
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is to show clearly how the depicted persuasion var:ables
affect each other..

standing is

~he

An important product of this

t~nder-

causal
flow of variables which is irn- - -

plicit to the model.

Varying reward affects first dis·

son.ance, then message consonant and cou11ter argument,

and finally persuasion and

attitude~

Increasing dis-

traction strength affects counter argument, then learnir1g
and cor1sonant: argument

attitude.

and ultimately persuasion and

This causal flotv allows us a format irt whtch

we can systematically vary aspects of the model experimer1tally.

It is to this process tha.t we now turn$

Chaoter V - An Experimental Model
Thus far the thrust of this research has not been
in the direction finding unidentified persuasion variables, but rather of taking established variables and
finding their common aspects.

The comprehensive theory

of distraction and expanded theory of cognitive dissonance presented in chapters 2 -· and. 3, · and the ·
model of the persuasive process presented in chapter
4, raise · many new questions . about how the various · .·

persuasion variables interact.
Previous studies have provided ample support for
much of the theoretical model, but several aspects of
the framework have not been tested adequately.

Although

they are not the only parts of the model which demand
testing in the near future, two parts, the basic model
and the concept of cognitive distraction, deserve more
immediate attention.

The basic model demands attention

because of its pivotal nature.

It is the connection

from message counter and consonant argument to persuasion that allows the rest of the model to tie together.
If the basic model works, it is a strong a::-gurnent

I10t

only for the basic moclel, but for the etltire model.
Cognitive distraction demar1ds attention because it demon-
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strates the inter-relationships between the varied
theories of persuasion.
Some evidence _.alreadv exists to support trte

model.

ba~i..c

Several experiments ha1e measured counter

argu~

ment production and at least one has employed a system
for measuring both counter and consonant argument.

In

each case, counter and consonant argument have been
treated only as dependent n1easures.

In the model,

message counter and consonant argument serve a dual
function.

They are dependent to the various persuasion

variables but should also be viewed as independent variables in studies of persuasion.

The basic model. then,

while supported in other studies, has yet to be adequately

testede
Direct experimental support for the concept of
cognitive distraction, by contrast, is almost
tent.

non-exis~

Indirect support abounds, but as the only criteri-

on measure used in most tests of cognitive dissonance9
is attitude change, it is difficult to attribute the

.

persuasion to eit.her dis . . . onance or distraction with an:y
great degree of accuracy.
overcome through the

lJSe

However, difficttlty can be
of the basic model.

The attempt

to overcome cognitive dissonance should evidence itself
in increased consonant argttment.

The

energy~-draining

effect of the dissonance, the distraction, should result
irt decreased counter ar~ument.

This combined - effect of

o6

dissonance and distraction is yet to be tested.
The model in Figure s · Qutl·nes : an._ experilnent ·

in which both the _p_asic model of

ersuasion and the con-

cept of cognitive distract1on can be

~ested~

The model

is based on the more comprehensive model outlined in
chapter 4·• . ·. ·. The experime1ita 1 . des i ·g n : imp lied.·. in the · ·

model involves manipulating two of the variables which
affect cognitive dissonance, initial attitude and rewarde
Manipulation of these

t\-70

variables shol1ld. 9 in turn,

affect message cor1sonant and counter argument.

Reward

should affect message consonant argument negatively
and message counter argument positively.

The effect of

initial attitude should be harder to predict.

·It would

be reasonable to expect that a more favorable initial
attitude toward a message would iz1dicate greater message

cot1sonant argument and less message counter argument

a less favorabLe attitude.

tb~n

In terms of cognitive dis-

sonance and distraction, however, message consonant argument production should decrease and message counter argumen·t increase, as attitude becomes more favorable.

As independent variables, message counter and consonant argument should effect persuasion.

As consonant

argument increases, pers1..1as ion should be expected to in-

crease, a positive

relationship~

As counter argument in-

creases, persuasion should be expected to decrease, a
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negative relationship.

Persuasion should, in turn,

be expected, along with initial attitude, to predict

final attitude.

Duration
and post -test order effects,
-

which also appear in Figure 8, are co·ntrol variables • . ·.: ··
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Their role in the experiment will become clear in the
methodology.

~

Chapter VI - Methodology
Using the test model outlined in chapter 5, · .·· an experiment was devised and executed.

Subjects were

drawn from the student population at Florida Technological University.

Most, but not all, of these subjects

were fulfilling communication department research requi~ements.

This requirement is imposed on all students

taking Speech 101, a course required of all students,
regardless of major.

The resulting sample population

should be considered representative of the entire student
body, not just of communication department majors.
experiment can be divided into three parts.

The

The first

part was a pre-study involving about 25 upper level
communication department students.
July, 1976.

It was performed in

The second part was a control study in-

volving 151 students.
Speech 101 classes.

Most of these students came from
About 20 came from an upper level

course in communication.

Five subjects from this sample

were dropped because of incomplete questionnaires.

The

last part of the manipulation, the actual experiment, in-

volved 56 volunteer subjects drawn from a second group of
about 150 Speech 101 students.

One subject was dropped

because an incomplete post-test precluded evaluation.

Both
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the second and third

~egrnents

of the experiment were

conducted in October, 1976.
The Pre-study
The objective of the pre-study was to determine

a message topic for use in the experiment.

Several

current issues were examined from the perspective of
two selection criteria.

The first criteria was that

opinions on the issue were well mixed.

'Ihe second

criteria was that opinions on the issue be predictable
from the Rokeach Value Scales (Rokeach, 1973).

Both

criteria had to be met in order for the issue to be
considered.

To test the issues on these criteria, sub-

jects were administered two questionnaires, one a survey
of opinions on current issues and the second the Rokeach
Value Scales.

Divergence of opinion was measured by com-

puting means and standard deviations.

Predictability was

evaluated through forward (stepwise) multiple regression
(Nie et aL, 1975) of the Rokeach values on those issues
which appeared to meet the criteria of mixed attitudes.
Several topics met both criteria.

Since the topic,

"God and the Bible are man's attempt to explain the v1orld"
most successfully satisfied the criteria, it was used
in a first attempt at the experiment.
ever, proved too salient.

The topic, how-

A high refusal rate (only l · of

16 subjects actually encoded a message) finally forced
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cancellation of the experiment.

The second best topic,

.. the military . budget should be cut to allow greater
spending on socia_l ___w~lfare programs," was then selected

for use in the experiment.
The Control Sarnole
The control sample was collected in order to develop

a regression equation for use in predicting initial
attitude in the experi ment.

Subjects were therefore

asked to complete the pre-test prediction instrument,
the Rokeach Value Scales, and the post-test instruments,
a political survey containing the measure of post-test
attitude, Brock's (1967) measure of counter argument
production, and a list of arguments used during the experiment.

In order to test for possible order effects,

that is, persuasion due to the order in -.:vhich the q.u est ionnaires · ·w ere : adrilinistereq, the ,questi0nnaires ·. were
distributed in six different orders.

The positions

of the Rokeach scale, the political survey, the arguments,
and an unrelated scale administered during the experiment were manipulated.

The Brock measure of counter

argument was always at the end of the questionnaire booklet.

Its order was also manipulated, however, as sub-

jects were asked to complete the scale either at the very
beginning of the survey period or after 5, 10, or 12 minutes.
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At the beginning of the survey period subjects
were informed that the data was being collected in
conjunction with an
experiment.
- -

The survey booklets

-~

(in the six orders) were distributed randomly in each
class.

If the class was among those asked to complete

the Brock measure first, they were instructed to turn
to the back of the survey booklet and complete the
measure of counter argument.

At the end of three mi-

nutes they were instructed to stop and complete the rest
of the questionnaire.

Other classes were told to begin

the questionnaire, but that they would be asked to stop
at some point to do something else.

After the specified

period of time these classes were also given their three
minutes to complete the measure of counter argument.
Analysis of the data involved two methodologies.

A composite post-test measure was developed using principal component analysis (Nie et
component criteria set at 1.

al~

1975) with the

The two factor matrix was

obliquely rotated to obtain the direct oblirnin loadings
with delta set at zero.
for each subject.

Component . scores were computed

A regression equation for use in re-

building the first component scores from responses to
the post-test political survey was computed using forward
(stepwise) multiple regression (Nie et al .. , 1975).

A

second regression equation was computed for use in pre-
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dieting first component scores from the Rokeach Value
Scales.

The effects of the varied orders on attitude

were assessed via -f6rward (stepwise) multiple regression.
Experimental Procedures
Before arrival at their appointments, subjects
were aware that they would be participating in a series
of experiments.

This was, to an extent, true, but most

of their activity centered around the manipulation.
Upon arrival they were given the Rokeach Value Scales
and told that the experimenter would return in a few
minutes.

The value scales (Rokeach, 1973) are two

ordinal scales of 18 values.

Subjects are asked, on each

instrument, to rank the values according to importance.
Research involving the scales indicates that they are
powerful predictors of personality, demographic factors,
and even product preferences.

Those interested in spe-

cific results should see Rokeach's (1973) own excellent
review of the research.
In this experiment the scales were used as a pretest predictor of attitude.

A particular strength of t he

scales are their topic neutrality.

It would be difficult

for a subject to draw any conclusions about the nature
of the experiment from the value scales.

This strength

is the basis of this experiment, for the use of any pretest which might have indicated what was expected of the
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subjects would have seriously compromised the results.
After completing the value scales, subjects \vere
brought to a second
room.
-- -

It was here that the funda-

mental manipulation occurred.

Subjects were seated in

front of a desk on which a tape recorder · rested and told
the following.

"This part of the experiment really isn't

an experiment at all, but rather a preparation for an
experiment we are planning on doing in a few weeks.

In

that experiment we are going to try to persuade people
to another point of view.

Usually, in this kind of ex-

periment they use actors.

That's great for those ex-

periments because, as you can imagine, actors, with their
training, can be very persuasive.

What it doesn't tell

us is how persuasive real people in the real world are.
That's what we want to find out in this experiment.

So

what we're asking people to do is record a short persuasive message on a topic.

We're asking everybody to

record the same message on the same topic. ,.
"The topic is that 'military bt.tdgets be reduced in

order to allow greater spending on social programs.•

Now I don't know how you feel about this issue and quite
frankly, I don't care.

However, we can offer you $.50

($1.50) to record a message on this topic. ••

At this

point the experimenter told subjects in the low reward
($.50) condition that: .. I realize that $.50 isn't a lot
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of money, but that it's more money than you'll have if
you don't encode the message."

This was done to make

the low reward ap.pear salient.

The experimenter then

reminded the subjects that they didn't have to encode
the message and asked if they would be willing to encode a persuasive message for the amount of money offered.
Subjects who declined were brought to a third room
where they were administered the post-test.
test will be described later.

This post-

Those who decided to en-

code the message were given a list

o~

five arguments

which could be used in encoding the message.

They were

then given an opportunity to prepare their message.

When

they were ready, subjects recorded their message on the
tape recorder.

The messages were anonymous and the medium

(tape) provided low channel visibility.

The messages were

timed so that any effect of message duration could be
analyzed.

At the completion of the message subjects were

paid and post-tested.
The post-test included four measurement instruments,

two of which, collected in conjunction with other studies,
were irrelevant to the experiment.

The purpose of these

irrelevant measures was the reinforcement of the concept
that subjects were participating in several experiments.
In the third measure, a political survey, only five of
the nineteen questions related to the message.

Indeed,
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the criterion measure of attitude used only three of
these five q_u estions.
likert scale format.
-. -

The questions were posed in a
In the final instrument the

measure of counter argument, subjects were given three
minutes to record the possible effects of reducing
military spending and i 'n creasing social spending.
In a very real sense, the measure of counter
argument was the only measure which could have violated
the experiment • s ·. internal validity.

First, as it involved

the topic of the persuasive message, it was possible that
the measure could have given the subject an idea of what
was being looked for.

Second, it could have served as

the equivalent of encoding a second persuasive message,
with a consequent effect in either inducing or reinforcing persuasion.

For this reason, the administration of

the instrument was manipulated by giving the instrument
either before or after the criterion political survey.
Here, it was hypothesized that if the instrJment violated
the experiment's validity significantly, the effect could
be measured in the post-test attitude scores.
In recording perceived 'effects,' as was done in the
measure of counter argument, subjects are not limited to
writing counter arguments.

This is the basis of the

measure, because subjects. when left free to record any
possible 'effects,• whether message counter and consonant
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arguments, should be expected to write down those arguments which are most salient, which have been recently
considered.

As such, the measure, when used soon after

a persuasive appeal, can be expected to measure those
arguments, both counter and consonant, which the subject · considered as a result of that message.

The in-

strument should, however, be considered as a measure
not only of counter argument, but of

co~sonant

argument.

It has been used, in this experiment, to measure both.
Being an open ended scale, the argument measure required judging.

An upper level communication class was

recruited for this purpose.

The judges (18 of them) were

told that they were engaged in judging the results of
an experiment.

They were not told anything about the

nature of the experiment.
handed out.

Written instructions were

The instructions stated that a consonant

argument was one which might be used in supporting the
position(s) that the military budget should be reduced
and/or that social spending should be increased.

Counter

arguments were those that might be used in supporting the
position that the military budget should be increased
and/or social spending should be decreased.

The judges

were asked to tally the counter, consonant, and neutral
arguments on each measure.

On the average, each measure

was judged independently by four judges.

Inter-rater re-
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liability was high, over .90 in every case.
Considered as a whole, the procedures conform to
the test model depicted in chapter five's Figure 8.
Subjects were manipulated on the basis of pre-test
attitude, reward (using nth number randomization techniques) and post-test order effects.

It was predicted

that reward and pre-test attitude would affect persuasion.

No prediction was made on the effect of post-test

order, and it was hoped that no effect would be found.
Message duration was measured to determine its possible
effect on persuasion.

Message counter and consonant

argument were measured as endogenous variables, variables
which were both independent in predicting persuasion and
dependent in their predictability from the manipulated
variables.

Finally, post-test attitude was measured.

An index of persuasion was constructed by subtracting
the pre-test attitude prediction from the post-test attitude.
Analysis of the data involved a variety of techniques.
Path analysis (via multiple regression) was used as the
principle test for · the model, but an analysis of variance
cell structure was utilized to clarify, through the calculation of means and standard deviations, the actual
effect of the variables on persuasion.

One variable, the

interaction of reward and pre-test attitude, was added to
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the path model during the course of analysis because
an analysis of variance indicated that the effect of
reward and attituae on persuasion was best indicated in
the interaction.

_Chaoter VII - Results_
As the analysis of the experimental data was

dependent on the results of the control manipulation,
the control data was analyzed first.

The most immediate

concern was over the effect questionnaire order had on
attitude.

It was felt that any effect could have pro-

found implications on both the control and experimental
data.

No significant or near significant effects of

order were found, however.

This result bolstered the

manipulations by demonstrating several things.

First, it

showed that the pre-test and post-test instruments had
no effect on each other.

Second, it demonstrated that

the list of arguments given subjects during the manipulations was not persuasive in and of itself, that persuasion in the experiment could not be attributed to this

list of arguments.

Third, it was shown that the measure

of counter argument had no persuasive impact of its own.

This result was later confirmed in the experiment, where
a similar manipulation yielded the same result.
Satisfied that the experiment was shown reasonably
pure of confounding effects, the experimenter turned to
the concern of developing a good predictor of pre-test
attitude.

Here, the first responsibility involved in-
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creasing sensitivity by developing a composite attitude
measure.

It was felt that five questions on the post-

test instrument related directly to the topic of the
persuasive message.

To clarify these relationships

the questions were compared using principle component
analysis.

The analysis yielded two components which

were then obliquely rotated • . Examination of these
components indicated that the second was not meaningful

as a post-test measure.

The first component, as · can be

seen in Iable 1, was very meaningful •
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Component one involves three questions from the
post-test measure.

Two, positiyely related to the

component, advocate increasing spending on social programs.

The third, negatively related to the component

would seem to involve spending priorities.

Subjects

who advocate increased military spending do

no~

increased social spending, and vice versa.

This inter-

advocate

pretation is, of course, highly consistent with the topic
~sed

in the experiment, that 'military spending should be

decreased in order to allow greater spending on social
programs.'

The second component

~nvolved

two questions,

both of which would appear to support the increased

81

social spending perspective.

It can be argued, though,

that educational quality can be improved and welfare
systems shifted to - jobs systems, without a major
spending increase.

Indeed, such shifts could involve a

decrease in costs.

Component two appears to reflect

this perspective.
On the basis of this analysis, component scores
were computed for the first component.

The scores,

the composite measure of attitude served as the basis for
the final phase of analysis on the control data.

The pur-

pose of this analysis was to devise a system for recreating these component scores, first from the posttest and, second, from the pre-test.

The method used.

in formulating both predictive equations was forward
(stepwise) multiple regression.
As the component scores were derived from the posttest survey, the correlation between the factor scores
and the post-test attitude regression predictions were

assured of identity.
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The three principie questions correlate .99 with

the component scores, indicating that the two questions
not attributed to the component have, in fact, little

82
impact.

Predicting the component scores from the post-

test proved more difficult.

According to Rokeach (1968)

an attitude is a system of beliefs and values.

Theoret-

ically, by tapping the values belonging to an attitude's
belief-value system, the attitude can be predicted.

The

value component of one such system, one surrounding
social and military spending priorities, is recounted in
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Here the system is presented in the form of a

multiple regression equation.
The table actually shows two equations.

The first,

titled standardized partial regression coefficients
(betas) shows the relative importance of the variables
to the equation.

Higher standardized betas indicate

the greater importance of a variable as a predictor of
the dependent variable.

The second equation, titled un-

standardized partial regression coefficients, is the actual
prediction equation.
The 11 values which form the value system represent
about one third of the Rokeach Values.

The entire value

scales can account for about 40% of the variance in attitude on the post-test measure.

The 11 variables in the -·
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equation correlate almost as well; their .61 multiple
correlation indicating a 37% prediction accuracy.
3% difference in

pr~diction

The

accuracy is small, especially

when it is considered that the additional variance is
accounted for by 25 variables.

The 11 variable equation

has, moreover, a lower standard error than other competing
equations.
The components of the equation make sense as the
value system surrounding attitudes on social and military
spending priorities.

Tr1e

meaningfulness of the first

value, national security, should be rather obvious.

It

should be expected that a person concerned about national
security would also favor military spending.

-A predis-

position toward military spending does not , however, preclude a favorable attitude toward social spending.

This

can be clarified, however, by consideration of the next
two variables, equality and freedom.
onstrates the

impo~tance

ing political ideology.

Rokeach (1973) dem-

of these two values in determinIn terms of American politics,

liberalism and conservatism can be predicted on the basis
of the ranking of eq.u ality, liberalism increasing as
equality becomes more important.

A liberal, in American

politics, would be expected to favor social priorities
while a conservative would be expected to favor military
priorities.

Rankings of_ freedom should further clarify
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this liberal/conservative breakdo,vn.

Low rankings of

freedom should indicate extreme feelings, leanings
past liberalism toward communism and past conservatism
toward fascism.
The fourth and fiftl1 variables in the equation,
true friendship, and honesty, although Jnot directly
associated with the dependent measure, are meaningful
Their effect is felt through the suppressor

predictors.

relationships they have with the variables already in
the equation, notably national security.

True friendship

and national security, considered together, would seem
to form an index of defensiveness or trust, with security
The nature of this

increasing as friendship decreases.

suppressor relationship can be exarn.ined in Table 4.
.....
....

-;'~

.....
,,

..........

-;,'~

PLACE
-;':

......
....

....

,I..

, ..

.J...

,I,.
~~

.....
, ..

True

........

.,,#
....

.....
....

......
, ..

-;•:

,,....

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
.......
on.

....

..r...

, ..

.,1 ...

.

friendship is correlated only .04 with the dependent
measure, but is correlated -.26 with national security,
the most important variable in the equation.

The result,

as shown in Table 3, is its standardized beta, a direct
effect equivalent to a .18 correlation.
Honesty's suppressor relationship is also with
national security.

The importance of security increases
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as the importance of honesty decreases.

It would appear

that people who feel honesty unimportant probably think
others feel the same- way.

Ultimately, then, a way of

defending oneself from the dishonesty of others (whether
the other is another person or another nation) is through
a strong national security.

The next variable, inde-

pendence, can be grouped with honesty because, again, the
variables suppress one another.

Together, these varia-

bles measure part of what may be the Machiavellianism,
Dogmatism, Intolerance of Ambiguity personality variable
group . (Rokeach, .1973).

It would be expected that as

dogmatism increased the prevailing .national thought
pattern, which, in the United States at this point in
time, seems to favor military over social spending, would
take priority.
Pleasure is related to freedom and equality, particularly equality, and draws additional strength from these
variables.

Pleasure appears to be related to political

ideo logy, as is a w·orld at peace.

This effect is apparent

not only in this study but in Rokeach ' s (1973) study of
the effect of value

cl~nge

on political ideology.

The

effect of these variables is to clarify the attitude prediction due to political ideology.
A world of beauty is perhaps the least correlated
variable in the entire value system.

It can work alone
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as a predictor.

A world where military spending could

be easily reduced so that social spending could be increased would indeed be a more beautiful world.

As

Rtlch, the predict ion due to a world of beaut.y· could

be said to be a measure of idealism, of a utopian
ethic.

Rokeach ( 1973) shows that concern 'vith this

value declines with age,, a hint that the generation gap
of the late 1960's and early 1970's, which made itself
most clearly in terms of attitude toward the military,

may have been due in part to differences in idealism
rather than to differences in political ideology.
The three remaining variables in the eq_u ation, o·bedi-

ent, cheerful, and clean, might be referred to as boy

scout values.

Their function appears to be that of

clarifying variables which are already in the system.
obedient and cheerful are both suppressed by independent.
As such they can be interpreted as contributing to Machia-

vellianism/Dogmatisrn prediction.

This interpretation

is consistent with the findings summarized by Rokeach
( 1973), \vhere both o·bed ience and cheerful were predictors

of these and other related personality measures.

Q:heerful

and clean seemingly are suppressed by value rankings of

a

~orld

of beauty.

From a logical standpoint, as both

o · these variables involve modes of beauty, t hey may act
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to reinforce the utopian co·n cept discussed earlier.
At any rate, cheer and cleanliness are ideal end states.
The value system. considered as a whole, can be
said to reflect four components of attitudes on social

and military spending priorities.

The first rotates

around political ideology, with liberalism associated
with social spending priorities.

The second involves

· trust and the need for security against the supposed
dishonesty of others.

The third involves idealism,

orientation toward a better world.

The last reflects

personality as measured in dogmatism, rnachiavellianism,
authoritarianism, intolerance of ambiguity, and other
related personality measures.

The 37% accuracy with which

this ·values system can measure attitudes on social and

military spending priorities is not, perhaps, optimal.
One would prefer such a measure to predict better than
this does.

It is, however, sufficient to the task of

making a pre-test prediction.

On balance, when one con-

siders that the value scales measure only 36 values out
of a pool of over 100 different values, when one remembers
that the value system is only a part of a much larger
belief system, wnen one recalls that the opinions of
friends and family can also affect attitude, the predictive accuracy of these few values is rather remarkable.
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With the analysis of the control survey data complete, it was possible to turn to the task of analyzing
the actual experime-n tal data.

The first step in thic,

analysis involved determining whether either initial
attitude or the amount of money offered influenced stibjects' decision to encode the message.

It had been

expected that both reward and pre-test attitude would
affect the subject's decision to encode the message,
with those in the more dissonant: conditions, low reward.
and negative attitude, less likely to encode the message.
No support was generated for these expectations.

The

F-r_atios for both main effects and the irtteraction were

less than one.
Using the data from the 39 subjects who actually

encoded the message, the effects of the actual manipulation were tested.

Although regression analysis would

be used in subseq_u ent analysis and would have yielded

more sensitive measurements in this case, the test was

made using analysis of variance with initial attitude
split into two groups at the mean.

The resulting 2 x 2

(initial attitude x reward) analysis of variance tested
for differences in post-test attitude.

If there had been

no persuasion, a main effect would have been expected for
initial attitude.

Developing expectations of what the

analysis would look like were there no persuasion was more
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difficult.

In fact, no main effect for initial attitude

would have been a meaningful indicator of attitude
change.

The prime expectations were reserved for re-

ward and the interaction.

The theoretical construct

would predict, for subjects ·with a positive initial
attitude (message consonant subjects) a slightly higher
post test attitude in the high reward condition.

Sub-

jects with negative initial attitudes (message dissonant
subjects) on the other hand, should have much higher posttest attitudes in the low reward than would be found in
the high reward condition.

This was expected to show

itself in a near significant effect for reward and a
highly significant interaction effect.
Table 5 shows the results of this analysis of vari-.
ance.

The effect of initial attitude is non-significant,

indicating that there was substantial persuasion as a re,,.
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In contrast, the interaction

This indicates that the persua-

sion occurred in the predicted

d~rections.

, makes no approach of significance.

But reward

This indicates an

unexpected balance in persuasion, with high reward
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equally different from low reward, although in opposite
directions, regardless of initial position.

The non-

significant difference on initial attitude, however,
erases the
sua~ion

po~sibility

of this effect being due to per-

in the positive initial attitude conditions.

Examination of the means, shown in Table 6, confirms
this interpretation.

Expected means for post-test atti-

tude in both the positive and negative initial attitude
conditions were determined from the control samole.
L.

Comparison of these means with the experimental means
shows, first, that there was very little attitude change
for high reward in either initial attitude condition, and
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second, that there was a great deal of aLtitude change
for low reward in both attitude conditions.

For the

negative initial attitude low reward condition, this
change indicated persuasion.

But for subjects with

positive initial attitudes, low reward provides a major
and unexpected surprise.

Subjects were actually dissuaded.

It was tempting to view this result as spurious,
so the result was analyzed more closely.

Means for per-

suasion, which was operationally defined as final atti-
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tude minus initial attitud.e were therefore calculated
for the four cells of the experiment and the two control
The control conditions in Table 7 show

conditions.

means eq.u ivalent to no change in both conditions.
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showed a r1:on-significant amount

Negative initial attitude low reward

subjects_ were highly persuaded.

Both of these results

are highly consistent with expectations.

Once again,

however, the positive initial attitude low reward condition is, contrary to expectations, highly dissuaded.
The analysis of variance for this cell breakdown, shown
in Table 8, confirms the significance of the persuasion.
This is no

The interaction is once again significant.
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surprise and is meaningful only in that it underlines the
fact that most movement is in the low reward conditions.
But, while there are ·no significant differences in reward,
there are significant differences in initial attitude conditions, indicating first that attitude movement is

92

balanced in reward conditions, and second that this
movement is in opposite directions.
Although these results seemed to support the
dissuasion phenomena, it was possible that the effect
was due to the extreme scores of a few individuals in
the experimental group.

Examination of the individual

scores does not support this interpretation.

None of

11 subjects in the positive initial attitude group were
dissuaded.

Neither of the persuaded subjects were highly

persuaded, but eight of the dissuaded subjects were.
The best conclusion that can be reached concerning
this dissuasion effect is that it is real.

The effect

holds true both in comparisons with non-experimental
control subjects and with the subjects' own initial atti-

tude.

It cannot, moreover, be localized to only a portion

of the experimental group.

Ultimately these results

leave us with an exclamation point and a question mark.
First, the hypothesis that persuasion in the negative
initial attitude conditions could be explained in terms
of traditional dissonance hypothesis was supported.

But

the second hypothesis, that persuasion in positive initial
attitude conditions could be explained by standard persuasion variables (an incentive hypothesis), while sup- ·
ported, leaves us with a question.

What could possibly
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explain dissuasion in an encoding situation?

An in-

teresting answer forwards itself, but it would be better
to hold the problems of the question mark until the
implications of the exclamation point have been explored more fully.
The overall success of the basic experimental manipulation allows exploration of the experimental model.
This model ., as presented in chapter 5 ·. and . suml!larized ·.

in Figure 8 is a four l evel causal structure f lowing
from independent (exogenous) to dependent (endogenous)
variables.

The experimental model involves two causal

and two non-causal (control) exogenous variables.

The

first of these variables, which was labeled post-test
order effects was significantly correlated with only one
variable, duration, a fellow non-causal variable.

It

can be said without quest ion that tr1is is a spurious
effect as the message (and its duration) preceded the
randomly assigned post-test in time.
Duration, the second non-causal exogenous variable
was significantly related to both initial and final
attitude.

Because of this relationship, message duration

was re-assigned to the second level of the causal structure as an endogenous variable.

The effect, although not

hypothesized, is not surprising.

The duration of a per-
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suasive message should be expected to influence the
effectiveness of that message.

But the nature of the

effect is not what one would expect.

Discussion of

this effect will be reserved briefly.
Implicit to the manipulation of reward and initial
attitude is the manipulation of a third variable, their
interaction.

In path analysis, treatment of a variable

interaction as an element of the causal flow violates
the techniques assumption that the relationships between
the variables are additive.

As interactions are essential-

ly multiplicative, the effect of this assumption is to
prohibit attempts to predict interactions additively
from the interacting variables.

Such an attempt would

make little sense, as interactions are generally relatively orthogona1 to the interactees.

This ortl:Jogonality

should preclude additive prediction in any case.

The in-

teraction remains a manipulated variable, however, and
as such may have importance as a predictor of s ub sequent
variables.

This is especially true in the encoding situ-

ation.
Where the interaction is placed at the same inclusion
level as the interacting variables, however, there is no
implicit violation of the path assumptions.

First, there

is no attempt to additively predict the interaction from
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the interacting variables.

Second, there

~s

no problem

of shared residuals, as the vari.ables are reasonably
orthogonal to one . an~ther.

Third, there is no viola-

tion of the assumption that changes in system variables
always occur as a linear function of changes in other
Rather, this assumption is strengthened with

variables.

the corollary that variables at the same inclusion level
are linear . functions only of those variables at preceding
inclusion levels, an assumption already enunciated in

the path assumption of a systems having no reciprocal
causations or feedback loops.

Finally, it should be

reasonably ' undebatable" that there is no causal relation1

ship between a variable and its interaction.

Rather, they

are separate variables which co-vary only insofar as a
change in one implies a change in the other.

The changes,

although mutually occurring, do not imply correlation

between the variables.
Two interaction effects will be examined in the experimental model.

As both interactions, the interaction

of reward and initial attitude, and the interaction of
message counter and consonant argument, are both examined
at the same inclusion level as and are reasonably orthog-

onal to, their components, there is no weakening of the
path assumptions.

The inclusion of these two interactions,
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as well as the aforementioned shift of duration from
exogenous to endogenous status, should be a good hint
that the experimental model did not survive intact.
This is indeed the case, and before presenting the
model as supported in the data, it would be well to
examine the reasons for the changes that were made.
The interaction of reward and initial atti ude
was added because the principle effect of these two
variables on persuasion is in their joint effect.

The

combination of dissonance and incentive predictions
gives maximum persuasion to the cross-products, not the

main effects.

This is not to say that reward and atti-

tude do not have individual effects.

As \vas seen in the

analysis of variance and will be seen below, they do.
Rather, the prediction is such that the interaction
cannot be ignored.
The next set of changes resulted from the reciprocal
effects of counter and consonant argument.

The correla-

tions between the two variables were such that it was
impossible to either reject causation between the variables or establish a non-reciprocal causal flow between
the variables.

The only solution to this problem was to

create a composite message argument variable.

This

difference variable (message counter argument was sub-
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tracted from message consonant argument) was highly
successful.

It

corr~_lated

highly with both component

variables as well as accounting for nearly all of the
varian~e

accounted for by the two variables in multiple

regressions on persuasion and final attitude.

The in-

teraction of the two variables accounted for additional
variance and, as we shall see later, provides a key
explanation of the question mark effect noted above.
The only other change in the model was, as has been
explained, message durations shift from exogenous to
endogenous status.

This leaves three variables at the

first (exog.e nous) inclusion level.

The relationships

between these variables, as given in the system, need not
be explained causally.

There are, however, relationships

among these variables.

Reward and the interaction are

correlated at the .02 level, which ·is hardly cause for
concern, and the interaction is non-significantly correlated .21 with initial attitude.

Reward and initial

attitude, however, are correlated -.31.

This correlation

is not only significant, (L=4, df=l/37, ~<.05), but
significant in the wrong direction.

Apparently there was

a tendency for those in the high reward condition to have
somewhat lower initial attitudes than those in the low
reward condition.

This correspondence could have had an
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effect in obscuring significance in the variables.
Low reward

subject~ _ w§re

expected to move to a higher

final attitude, especially where their initial attitudes
were low.

Higher initial attitudes in the low reward

condition could have obscured this persuasion, an effect
that could be expected to evidence itself in suppressing
reward and initial attitude.

This suppression, although

evident in the analysis, never proved to be a difficult
problem.
~1anipulation

of the exogenous variable system should

effect changes in the rest of the model .

The most immedi-

ate effects · in this system should be on the actual act

of encoding, the second level of the experimental model.
The second level, as originally outlined was composed of
counter and consonant argument.

These components, for

reasons outlined above, were converted into interaction
and difference variab l es,

In a dd ition, t he variable mes -

sage duration was moved to a position between the first

and second inclusion levels.
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the entire path analysis, message duration is the first
dependent variable analyzed.

Three variables, reward,
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initial attitude, and reward x initial attitude, precede it in the

syste~.

Of these, only one, initial

attitude, is a significant predictor (L=5.17, d(=l/35,

R=.OS) of message duration.

The direct effect of initial

attitude is represented by its standardized partial regression co-efficient, 137, a figure which compares well
with its zero order correlation of .42, indicating that
subjects with positive initial attitudes spoke longer.
As message duration is the first endogenous variable
in the system, there are no indirect effects at its level.
The multiple correlation of the three exogenous variables
with duration is .44.
The next level involves the interaction and difference components of counter and consonant argument.

The

two variables are correlated -.01, underscoring the
lack of causal relationship.

The interaction of message

counter and consonant argument is significantly predicted
by

only one variable, message duration, (f=4, 15, df=l/34,

~<.05)

but the indirect effect of initial attitude through

duration allows the otherwise weak effect of initial
attitude to become a trending direct effect of .30(f=2.69 ,
df=l/34, £=.11).

The multiple correlation of the pre-

ceding system variables on message counter x consonant
argument is only .37, an indication that these variables
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account for only a small portion of the variance in the
interaction.
The difference measure of counter and consonant
argument, called argument in Table 9, is predicted by
all of the three exogenous measures, but is not related
to the fourth preceding measure, message duration.
st~ongest

The

predictor of argument is initial attitude,

(f=5.65, Qf=l/35, Q<.025) a variable whose total effect
of .35 is composed largely of its direct effect.

Re-

ward x initial attitude is the second significant predictor (f=4.10, df=l/35, Q<.OS).

The effect of reward

alone results in a trend (!=3.2, df=l/35, ~=.08) which
may be more important than its significance level would
indicate.
Persuasion is the major interchange of the model.
It is here that the threads of direct and indirect
effects take action in modifying attitude.

Up to this

interchange, indirect effects, the effects variable A

has on variable C by way of its effect on variable B,
have been minor.
portance.

Here they take on a great deal of im-

Because of this, the results are rather complex .

The reader is directed to Table 9, where these results
are clearly summarized.

Reward, with a direct effect of

-.01, has no direct influence on persuasion in the model.
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The direct effects of initial attitude and initial
attitude x

reward,~ - ~.60

significant,

and .31, respectively, are

These results are hi-ghly consistent with

those obtained in the analysis of variance depicted in
Figure 8.
The direct effects of message counter and

conso~

nant argument also proved meaningful indicators of persuasion.

The difference measure (consonant-counter argu-

ment) was the more important of the two, its .55 partial
beta an indicator of its strength in predicting the persuasion.

The interaction (consonant x counter argument)

was less important, with a -.24 partial beta, but remains
significant.

Interpretation of these results in terms

of the hypotheses is difficult, and until we can look
at these composite measures in terms of their components,
it should be remembered that these are composite scores.
It can be noted, however, that these measures are effective predictors of persuasion.
Although no hypothesis had been forwarded concerning
the effect message duration would have on persuasion,
the author was surprised to find duration had a direct
effect of -.32.

It seemed reasonable to expect that in-

creased message duration would increase both commitment
to the message and message consonant argument, thus in-
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creasing persuasion.

It can be concluded from this

result, that if duration increased either commitment or
consonant argument, the effect was more than balanced
by some other effect.

•

There appear to be two explana-

tions for the negative correlation between duration and
persuasion.

The first, that message counter argument

increases with duration, may have some influence, but
cannot be accepted due to the low correlations between
duration and the measures of argument.

The second, that

message duration is positively related to initial attitude, which in turn is negatively related to persuasion,
makes more sense in light of the results.
It has already been noted that initial attitude
effects message duration directly.
is .42.

.37.

The raw correlation

Its direct effect in the presence of reward is

Initial attitude is negatively related to persua-

sion because only those with anti-message initial attitudes can be expected to experience and attempt to reduce
dissonance.

As such they are more persuasible than those

initially pro-message.

Message duration re(lects this

effect isolating those who init'ially agree with the message and are likely both to speak longer and to be less
persuaded from the rest of the sample.

An important . : ··

aspect of this direct effect of message duration on per-
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suasion is the indirect effect .of initial attitude on
persuasion~

Table 9 shows an indirect effect of -.12 for
initial attitude on persuasion via message duration.
Although the effect appears small and is counter-balanced
by the indirect effect of initial attitude via the

difference measure of message counter and consonant
argument, it should not be regarded lightiy.

Although

t.he direct effect of dt.lration is significant, its total

effect takes into account two positive indirect effects
of .09 arid

06.

Although neither effect is large, they

reduce the total effect of message duration to a nonsignificant -.19.

The most meaningful indlrect effects

in this portion of the model are those of reward and

reward x initial attitude, -.1.4 and .15e respectively.
These effects act first in enhancing the total effect
of the interaction and second, in demonstrating that
reward has some effect all 1ts owrt.

Interpretation of

these indirect effects is not possible without examining
the compor1ents of the contposite measure of counter and
consor1ant argument ar1d will, as such, be reserved until

later.
It can be seen in these results, that self-persuas1on
in the encoding situation is a

h~ghly cDrnplex

process.

No less than five significant main effects have traced
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their way into the process.

It must be noted, ho,Jever,

tha·t these five threads and their

in·tert\vin~ngs

do a

remarkably credible job of explaining the process of
persuasion.
regress~on

The multiple correlation achieved in the
of these variables on persuasion is .84, an

accounting of 70% of the variance in the depender1t

variable.

This correlation is extremely

signif~cant

(F=l2;'78, df=q/32, ,!2-S.Jxi0-~ 7 ). · Tl1U$ . whil~ . it :m ust;_.. be

said that the process is a complex one, it should not
be inferred that it is too complex to be understood.
The last stage of the model, Final Attitude, is
something of an anti-climax after the heavily trafficked
intersection that precedes it.

There are only two direct

effects, initial attitude and persuasion.

The multiple

correlation is 1.00, a perfectly understandable result
when one recalls that persuasion is a linear combination
(the char1ge score) of initial and final attitude.

The

important results here are the indirect effects, all of
which occur via persuasion.

None but one bear

remar~ing

on further than has already been done except to say _that
a direct effect on persuasion is an ind1rect effect on
attitude.

Th1s, of course, is not a result

of definition

but a matte r

Initial Attitude has both direct and

indirect effects on Final Attitude.

Interestingly, these
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effects balance each other, leaving initial attitude
with almost no total effect on final attitude.
Having arrived at final attitude, the model is
complete.

The balance of the model is excellent. as can

be seen in the joint or spurious effects of Table 9.
No joint or spurious effect exceeds .02, which speaks
well for the model.

There are questions which remain to

be answered, however, particularly as concerns effects
on the individual components of the differen.ce measure of
counter and consonant argument.

Tables 10 and 11 depict

the multiple regression of initial attitude, reward and
their interaction on both message counter and consonant
argument.
,.t,.
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analysis of variance table with the change variance ,r
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change) of each variable substitu·ted for the sum of

squares.
The effects, as can be seen in Lables 10 and 11, are
fairly stra1ghtforwarda

Message consonant

&~gurnent

is

sigr1ificantly predicted by only one val."'iable, initial

attitude, while message counter argument was significantly
predicted by both reward and the interaction but not by
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ini·tial attitude.

The correlation of counter and

consonant argument (~=~.51) tends to blur these results
somewhat, when indirect effects are considered, but the
direct effects of reward, initial attitude and their
interaction on message counter and consonant argument
is unmistakable.

These results indicate that the level

of message consonant argument is determined largely by
the subjects' initial attitude.

The relationship, with

a correlation of .52, is positive, indicating that, as
might be expected, subjects with more favorable initial
attitudes used more message consonant arguments.
The influence of reward on message counter argument
was equally
(~=.32)

straightfo~vard,

with its simple association

positive, indicating that higher rewards were

accompanied by higher levels of counter arguments.
interaction of reward

The

and initial attitude is more

difficult to interpret, however.

Its negative correla-

tion with message counter argument (r=-.38) indicates
that the highest levels of counter argument occurred
in the favorable initial attitude, low reward and the
unfavorable initial attitude, high reward conditions.
Together, the effects of · reward and reward x initial
attitude leave the unfavorable initial attiLude

high

reward condition \vith the highest level, the

favorable

t".?O
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initial attitude· conditions with smaller and approximately
eq_u al levels,

and ~

-t -he most dissonant condition, tl1e

unfavorable initial attitude, low reward condition,
with the smallest level of message counter argument.
In chapter s· :.it.- was ,-..hypoit he.si-ze.d_. ·t -h at ;·,o ogni.t.-iYe.· \dissonance could evidence itself in either cr both
of two ways.

It was first hypothesized that the act of

overcoming cognit1ve dissonance would result in increased
message consonant argument.

This hypothesis follows

from the existing literature on cognitive dissonance.
The second hypothesis, built on the theoretical :·.:::·.-.. ..-···

construct presented .- in·· chapters · .2, ·. 3 . ~ a:nd . 4, · predicted

that the effort involved in overcoming the dissonance
would result in decreased n1essage counter argument.

The

high positive correlation between initial attitude and
message consonant argument, although a perfectly reason-

able result, does not support the first of these two
hypotheses.

This result is not nearly as irnportan·t to

the hypothesis as is the non-significance of reward
and reward x initial attitude,. at least one of which
should have differentiated between levels of message
consonant argument.

These results fail to support the

traditional dissonance viewpoint, that persuasion under
dissor1ant conditions is the dtrect resu.lt of justifying
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actions with att1tudes, of finding good reasons for
one's actions.

11Je _.e ffects of reward and reward x ·

initial attitude on message counter argument provide
excellent support for the second hypothesis, however.
The least counter argument occurs in the $.50 dissonant
condition, the most dissonant condition.

Of the three

variables, only initial attitude did not significantly
predict counter argument.

Finally, both reward and the

interaction have the correct relationship to message

counter argument.
Implicit to these results, that persuasion due to
dissonance was not due to justifying actions with atti-

tudes, but rather the result of distraction from con-sider~ng

existing attitudes, is an explanation for the

dissuasion observed in the favorable initial attitude, low
Table 12 displays the means of the

reward condition.

experimental groups on several of the experimental

variables.
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The first, which can be observed in the

message counter and message conso11ant argument coltlmns,
is the isolation of those subjec"ts . in the negative
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initial attitude, high reward group.

cant

differences~ - as

All of the si gnifi-

determined by t-ratios, in these

columns, were with this group.

The negative initial

attitude encoders had the highest means for counter
argument and the lowest means for consonant argument.
The second pattern, seen in the counter X consonant
argument column, is the isolation of the low reward,
negative initial attitude group.

The groups mean on

the interaction is significantly lovJer than those or th.e
other groups.
The third pattern involves the clear separation of
nearly all the variables in the duration column$

There

is only one non-s ignificar1t difference here, that betv1een

the highly persuaded low reward, negative initial atti·tude group and the high reward,
group.

pos~tive

initial attitude

The high reward, negative initial attitude

condition lies significantly below these groups.

The

low reward positive initial attitude group lies signifi-

cat1tly above them.

This pattern is important in and of

itself, because it is firmly contrary to the expectations of the incentive perspective"

Higher rewards, in.

incentive theory, yield greatP.r effort.

Here, however,

the opposite holds true, \·rith low reward yielding in-

creased message durat1on in both positive and negative
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initial attitude groups.
sion in the lo-r11

r~"'?C!.rd,

With respect to the dissuapositive initial attit t1de

group, this same pattern gives an . in.portant clue.

The high reward, negative initial attitude group
has the shortest mean message duration, an indication,
that the group didn't put as much into the message as
the other groups.

Incentive and dissonance theorists

might argue for a lifetime over the meaningfulness of
this result, but it makes sense in terms of other measures
used in the experiment.

Simply, the group has the highest

level of counter argument and the lowest level of consonant argument.

It might be said that the group did

an excellent job of 'biased scanning,' favoring courter
arguments over consonant.

Having found fet.v consonartt

arguments, they recorded a .s hort mes s age
The lo'"' reward, positive initial attitude condition

has the longest mean message duration.

Here the differ-

ence does not appear to be due to doing a good job of
biased scanning, but rather the opposite.

AlthotJgh the

group has the h1.ghest mean for consonant argument, it
also has the second highest mean for counter argument.
This movement is reflected in the coun.ter X consonan-c
argument column of Table 12.

The group's score, the
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highest in ·the column, is lndicative of a generally
low level of

bia~ _ in

considering arguments.

By contrast, the low reward, negative initial
attitude group did an excellent job of biased scanning.
The group has the lowest level of message counter argument and the second highest level of message consonant
argument.

Ultimately, ho\vever, the group's strongest

evidence of good biased scanning is in the interaction
of counter and consonant argument.

Its score here,

easily the lowest, argues that more than one subject
had qero in the counter argurner1t column.
The explanation, as outl1ned abo,re, lies in the

incentive concept of biased scanning, a concept which
was shown in chapter three to be strongly related t o that
of cognitive distraction.

For the purpose of this experi-

ment , the high reward conditions of both t he pos i tive a nd
negative initial attitude groups serve as refe r ence po i nts
to demonstrate how bi ased scanning operates.

The hi gl1

reward, negative initial attitude groug functions pret ty
much the way a group might be expected to \vhere dissor1ance

could be reduced through channels other than attitude
change.

They perceive arguments supporting their pos i t io n.

They fail to perceive non-supportive (message consonant )
argtiments.

In the l .o

1

rewa·rct, negativ e attit ude group ,
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the reward left no alterr1ative dissonance reduction

chann.e l open.

Th~Y.

_therefore cl anr1eled their available

energy into finding good reasons for their action.s,

diverting energy from the act of counter arguing

The

imbalance created by finding the good reasons (consonant
arguments) while not message counter arguing yielded
persuasion and a reduction of dissonance.

This is

clearly biased scanning, but it is composed of as much
of a reduction in message counter argument as it is of
an increase in message consonant .argument.
Using the high reward, positive initial attitude
group as a base point, biased scanning in the absence of
cognitive dissonance can be observed.

It should be

expected that subjects who initially agree with a message
will be biased toward message consonant arguments.

This

is in fact the case in both the high and low reward con·
ditiot1S of the positive initial attitude group.

The low

reward condition, however, has higher means for both
counter and consonant argument.

It can be · argued that

the differences between the means for counter and carlsonant argument are about the same for both groups and
that the means do not significantly differ from each other,
but the increase in counter argument prodt1ct ion is a

signal of poor biased scanning in the low reward, positive
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initial attitude group.
This signal

~~ - ~trengthened by

counter and consonant argument.

the interaction of

liere, the strength of

the difference between the means of the low reward 1
positive initial attitude group and the other groups
appears to vary direct:ly with the quality of tl1e biased
scanning in the comparison gro ,Pt

ThtiS

the difference

between low reward, positive initial attitude and low
reward, negative initiaJ. attitude, the group whose
scanning bias was clearly the most effective, is signiti-

cant (t=3.04, df=l8, 2 .007).

W1th the next most effec-

tive grouo, high re,¥ard, positive

init~al

attitude, the

difference is a trend (t=l.S, df=20, !2_=.149).

With high

reward, negative initial attitude, the difference is not
significant (t=l,l9, df=20, g=.248).
Together these results make an interesting

picture~

lvl1ere there is dissonance, low reward increases biased
sc~nning

and effort.

\vhere there is no dissonar1ce, lo\v

r-eward decreases biased scanning and increases effort.

The latter result may seem somewhat 1ncongruous.
one might ask

How,

can effort increase as bias decreases.

A look at the correlations between the various se·t s of

means clarifies this.

The interaction of counter and

consonant argument, a.n inte-raction that mi.ght well go by
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the name biased scanning, for that is what it appears to
represent,
sion.

correlate~.

.,.9969 with tr1e means for persua-

Despite the small df, this relationship is highly

significant (F=477.93, df=l/3, ..Q=.0002)f ir1dicating that
the two measures are much more highly related than was
ind.icated in the mode 1,

Duration and consonant ·argument

are also highly correlated (.9544).
is also significant

(F=30~65,

This relationship

df=l/3, Q=.Ol)e

Finally,

counter argument is correlated -.85 with final attitude,
a near significant relationship (F=7.98, df=l/3, Q=.06). ·
Together, these correlations paint an interesting
picture of a three tiered model of cause and effect in
persuasion.

Manipulation of reward and attitude affect

counter argument, consonant argument, and through them

biased scanning.

These affect, respectively, final atti-

tude, duration, and persuasion.

Although this model is

simplistic, it underlines the separation between effort
and biased scanning.

One need not expend great effort

to perceive selectively.

Similarly, poor biased scanning

does not preclude high degrees of effort.
The picture, however, based as it is on t-ratios
and correlated means, should be viewed with great catttione
The statistics with which the picture is painted are weak

ones, and their use is only

justif~ed

by

the post hoc
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nature of this portion of the resultso

The important

thing is the logic - and cons isterlC)' of the explanation
they support,.

B~aoed

scan11ing mak6 s sense, not only a s

·the mechanism whicl1 ir1 .imbalance can yield persuasion.
but as a source of d iss\las ior1 when exercised poor lye

The picture is, rnoreover, consistent with the results
surrounding the model, notably th.e positive relationships
that initial attitude has v{ith

~cnsonant

argument and

duration, and that reward x initial attitude has w1th

counter argument.

. Chapter VIII - Discussion
Before exploring the in1plications of the results
outlined above, it would be well to consider any weaknesses apparent in the experiment.

The only real problem

area involves the measuring ..- instruments ··used ' in ·.the ..

experiment.

As has .already been pointed out, the pre-

test attitude measure accounted for only 37% of the sum
of squares in the post-test attitude measure.

The problem

here is not serious enough to threaten the experiment, but
it urges caution in interpreting results.

This caution,

in the form of multiple tests of significance and conQ
sideration of corollary evidence, . has been exercised
tl1roughout the experiment and the discussion of results.

The pre-test/post-test discrepancy is not the only source
of error in the experiment, however.

The measures of

message counter and consonant argument are, at best, only
reflections of a su.bject 's thoughts duri11g the manipula-

tion.

Because of variations in delivery, message

dura~

tion cannot be considered an entirely accurate measure
either.

These potential sources measuren1ent error can

be expected to multiply in the composite meast1res of per-

suasion and message counter and consonant argument, resulting in no less than eight sources of measurement error.
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The focus of this error is persuasion, the difference

measure

construct~d _ by

subtracting the already standard-

ized measures of initial attitude from final attitude.

The measure is subject to three sources of error in the
reliability of the pre-test value scales and the posttest questionnaire, as well as the less than ideal
correlation between the

t~vo

measures'"

Among tl1e measures

regressed on persuasion are initial attitude, duration,
and the composite measures of message consonant and ·
counter argument, all of which are potential sources of
error.

The focus of this potential error is persuasion

and it is there that we see just how potential this

error is.
Between reward, initial attitude, reward x initial
attitude, duration, consonant minus counter argument and
consonan·t x counter argument, 70% of · the variance in per-

suasion can be accounted for.

If we make the unlikely

assumption that as much as 5% of this variance is spurious,
that leaves 35% of the v'aric..nce unaccounted for.

The

conclusion that all of this variance is due to error
would compliment to the model but ignores factors which
are already known to affect persuasibility, including
personality, message salience, and problems of history,
including selective

pre-expe~r -irTtental

ir1oculation due to
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factors like membership in R.

o.

T.

c.

or past service

in the armed forc-e-s-.-· Thus, while measurement error had

a tremendous potential for - confounding the experiment,
it can only be concluded that this potential was

ne~er

realized.
This unrealized potential underscores the success
of the manipulation.
supported.

Nearly every hypothesis offered was

Where theoretical constrt1cts conflicted, t .he

evidence left little doubt as to which was to be preferred, at least within the constraints of the design.
Unexpected results were provided with ample evidence of
both their validity and their sources.

Finally 9 the re-

sults were defined with enough clarity that it was possible to demonstrate at least part of the spurious significance which is almost unavoidable when working with
numbers of variables.

The strength of the experiment was its control.

Al- · .

though only two variables were directly manipulated, it
had been hypothesized that these manipulations would

indirectly affect other variables, including counter
argument, consonant argument, and message duration.
These variables were also measured, allowing assessment
of the overall effect the five variables had on attitude

change.

The conditions of the experiment were des igned

119
to provide maximum separation between tasks.

Thus pre-

testit1g was done _in ..one room, the manipulation performed
in a second, and the post-testing done out of sight in
a hallway.

Subjects were drawn from a community whi.c h

co1Jld be expected to be representative of ·the entire

university rather than communicatiorrs majors.

Finally,

the con.d itions of the experiment were, for the most part
rather relaxed.

The small separation between rewards is a potential
weakness of the manipulation.

Certainly, as both rewards

are low when compared to those offered ir1 many experi- ·

rnents, a certain degree of caution is warranted in comparing these results with those of other experiments.
But the success of the manipulation despite the small

difference between a low reward. of $.50 and a high reward of $1.50 speaks for the strength o f the theoretical
construct on ,.;hich . the experirner1t was based, especial ly
when one considers that the differences a.ttributa ble to

reward were often as great or greater than those a t t ribut able to initial attitude.

The validity of the test measures was established ir1

the control satnple.

Although the 150 subjects comprise

a relatively small sample for use in a 36 variable s t ep wise multiple regression probedure, about f our sub j ect s
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for each input variable, the final equation used only
12 variables, leaving a respectable ratio of about
12 subjects per variable.

Of particular note was the

performance of the Rokeach Value Scales.

The multiple

correlation with the final attitude measure, .61, is not,
perhaps, as high as one might desire, but it is substantial, especially when the indirect nature of the measurement is considered.
Comparability of the results with previous experiments was established using analysis of variance statistics.

In many ways the analysis duplicated the multiple

regression statistics used later in the results.

Analy-

sis of variance is really a generalized version of the
multiple regression statistic.

But besides providing

a reference point for those unfamiliar with multiple
regression and path analysis, the statistics served as a
check against measurement error and regression effects
in the data.

The heart of the manipulation was the experimental
model.

It was here that all the diverse measurements

employed in controlling the experiment were brought
togett1er into a cohesive framework.

Tt1e model itself

was based ort the research set forward in chapters 2: ·}
and 3~ . ~·and fo.rma·lized :·; in . the fo:u rtrl and· f ·ifth :chapter.

The
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larger model, outlined in chapter 4 ,-.··d escribed ·a · . .-_

broad portion of ·the· persuasive

p r ocess~

Although it

was based on research in distraction and counter-attitudinal advocacy, it may well apply to a much larger
portion of the persuasive process than that represented
by its forebears.

The experimental model was much more

limited, testing critical portions of the larger model.
Both models, of course, are purely theoretical, but they
are based on and make sense in terms of existing

research~

The post-experimental version of the smaller model
is depicted in Figure 9.
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presentation of Table 9 and is explained in detail in
the results.

The flow of the variables from independent

to dependent 1s clearly visible.

The connections

repr~-

sent the meaningful direct effeets discerned in the
study.

Although the normal cutoff point for direct ef- ··.· ·.: ·

fects in a path analysis is r>.OS, this criterion of
meaningfulness originates in the large scale observational
studies which are characteristic of research in sociology
rather than the more tightly controlled small to medium
sample studies ,.;hich are cr1aracteristic of com1nunication
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research.
is a more

For the purposes of this experiment, r>.20
practi~~l

cutoff for judging the meaningful-

ness of direct effects.

Thus in F1gure 9 arrows connect

variables only if the direct effect exceeds .20.

In-

direct effects can be calculated from the diagram by
multiplying the direct effect of

th·~

affective variable

on the mediating variable by the direct effect of the
mediating variable on the affected variable.
The model seen in Figure 9 is not the same model
that was presented in cr1apter 5 ·• ··. One·.·of the· :.Cesul.ts ·· ,.
of the experiment is an increase in our knowledge of the
persuasive process.

Thi.s knowledge has allowed and to

a certain degree, demanded changes in the theoretical
framework.

It should not be conclttded, however, that

these changes were statistically motivated.

The path

diagram is not a statistical construct, but a theoretical construct governed by such rules as are necessary to
all0tv controlled statistical testing

and~

where the model

is adequate, prediction.
A test of the model in its original form (see Figure
8, chapter five) showed certain flaws in its construction.
Message counter and consonant argument were obviously far
too highly correlated to exist as separate variables i n
a nor1-causal sequence,

The tnteraction of counter artd

123
consonant argument proved too important an indicator
of dissonance to -be left out of the model.
cater of biased

s~anning,

~san

indi-

the interaction of counter

and consona\t argument proved too important to ignore.

Message duration proved to be more than a simple control

var~able.

Adjustments were made in the model to

account for these factors and the revised model in

Figure 9 is the result.
The revised model differs from its original in
two ways.

First, it is more complete, accounting for

the effects of selected interactions.

This accounting

would have been made on a non-selective basis in an
analysis of variance

Second, it is more parsirnonious,

with only those variables which could truly be called
exogenous enjoying that designation and the joint and
spurious effects of the variables reduced to zero"
Neither model could be said to be more ln accordance with
the

theo~etical

2 ~;:-<3

,. ·~ and · ·4 ~ - · althougl1 the revis·ed· mode1 represents

constrt1ct presented in chapters .·:

the concepts 1.1nderlyi ng tl1e

tl1~oret

ical

con.st~uct

more

flllly,

This last point is important for

althougl1 there

undoubtedly is a unique best model of the process of
persuasionf

tt~

experinental model is only of limited
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scope and accuracy.
flow depicted in

Indeed, although most of the causal

F~gure

9 will probably stand up to t he

test of t irne, there are qu.e st ions that need to be ans\vered

before it can be wholly accepted.

Of particular concern

is the location of duration in the causal flow.

Tr1e

path analysis seemed to support the flow indicated in
the figure, but the simple correlation of group means
for consonant argument and duration argues that duration
may follow consonant argument ir1 the causal flow.

Cer-

tainly, it can be safely assumed that increased duration
does not cause increased message consonant argument.
Although the model is consistent ·with ··· theory· in
persuasion it does not fully accept any of the traditional
views of the counter-attitudinal process.

The central

hypothesis of incentive theory; a positive relationship

between reward, effort, and persuasion, received no
support 1n the presence of dissonance.

In the non-dis-

sonant conditions the direction of the persuasion was
right, but was due not to persuasion in the high reward
condition, but to dissuasion in the low reward condition.
The biased scanning h;.rpothes is, by comparison 1 fared

quite well, although the workings of the mechanism are
described somewhat differ~ntly tl1an the)' were originallyo
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The hyootr1esis of cognitive dissonance, that reward
was negatively related to persuasion in the presence of
dissonance, received considerable support, but the reason
for the persuasion, a search for a justification of
action and attitude, was not supported.

Only initial

attitude significantly affected consonant argument.
Dissonance affected counter argument, creating support
for cognitive distraction and biased scanning as the
mechanisms underlying persuasion due to unrelieved cognitive dissonance.

It can be said, then, that the model

combines the best components of several theoretical
viewpoints into a larger and more comprehensive theory.
In reality, the only experimental result that was
not totally in harmony with the larger construct outlined
in the early chapters was the dissuasion in the low reward, positive initial attitude group.

Tle construct did

not allow for dissuasion in an attitudinal encoding situation.

It appears, however, that poorly rewarding an

encoder with a positive initial attitude can result in
poor biased scanning.

It should be imagined that this

can only occur where personal commitment is not high.
Using reward to dissuae a missionary is unlikely to have
the desired effect.

The missionary likely sees other re-

wards in attitudinal encoding;

But where there is neither
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a missionary type commitment nor a dissonant aversion
to a message, low reward may well have a deleterious .
effect on attitude.
The evidence supporting the poor biased scanning
explanation is not the best offered by this experirnen.t.

It is however, very consistent and highly significant.
Although the dissuasion is, at least in terms of this
study, very real, the pl1enomenon demands further re-

search in which depth of conviction is measured along
with the reward and initial attitude variables.

Despite

the chapter three claims to the contrary, the d iss,Jasion in this experiment is not an isolated incident,
even among the experiments reported.

Nuttin (1966) notes

a similar dissuasion pattern in his experiment.

Close

examination of Janis and Gilmore (1965) indicates,
moreover, that the persuasion reported in their positive
sponsor co·nditions may actually have been dissuasion

due to poor biased scanning in their negative sponsor
conditions.
the

re~lity

This evidence serves notice not only of

of dissuasion

du ~

to poJr biased scanning,

but of the dangers of tunnel vision in the early stages
of research.
The defeat of the hypothes ' s that any message en-
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coding situation will yield persuasion in the direction
of argument is not · a · rnajor defeat for the
construct.

theor~tical

In fact, it tightens the theory.

In the

presence of the hypothesis it was impossible to say
\.Vtlether the cognitive d i.stract ion was due to the effort

of encoding the message or the dissonance caused by the
disparity between action and attitude.
With the hypothesis discarded the distraction can
be attributed to the dissonar1ce.

It is noteworthy that

biased scanning may have two edges, that one can scan
poorly and be affected by that act.
Overall, the results give a little more insight into
how attitudes fluctuate and can be controlled.

It was

a little scarv to think that an employer would get the
most loyalty from the employee he pays least.

Now one

can be encouraged in the knowledge that after winning
loyalty v.1ith low salary, an employer will have to pay

to keep that loyalty.

The results also point up the

near perfection of the Judeo-Christianf Moslem message
of salvation.

To the non-believer, the message holds

a low reward, allowing persuasion through unrelieved dissonance.

Upon conversion, however, the message, salva-

tion, becomes a high reward, encouraging maintenance.

This interpretation is supported in the pre-study results forwarded in cl1.apter 6~ ·. ~ Respondents ·,_ . ~hen·-·_
filling out the Rokeach Value Scales, almost invariably rank salvation either first or last.

The correla-

tion between this ranking and church attendance exceeds
r>.90.

Apparently, then, the converted rank religion ·9 s

message high

~vhile

the unconverted do the opposite.

Thus t6e message for those who wish to remain agnostic
is 'Beware of he who comes bearing gifts of salvation.'

Chapter IX - Conc··t lts ions

Corning to the conclusion of an experiment as
successful as this has been is a pleasure, because it's
fun to write about things that have gone well.

In

. revie\v, however, the author began by examining the re-

search in persuasion due to distraction.

There proved

to be enough consistency in the data to organize dis-

tractions into a variety of categories.

The · effects of

the distractions in the various categories differed,
but there '\vas a clear linear flow to the differing

categories and their effects.

Two comprehensive hy-

potheses were offered and a hypothetical, but untested,

category of distraction was examined in depth.
This category, cognitive distraction, was offered
as the mechanism_ by ·w hich cognitive dissonance affected
perst1as ion.

A review of the research in counter-att i-

tud inal ad·vocacy provided st1pport for the hypothetical
mechanism.

T'he mechanism proved useful, n1oreover, in

orga·n izing t ·h e reseai'ch in a . cons isten~ theoretical

framework.

A series of r1ypotl1eses were forv.rarded and

the author proceeded to formalize the h}rpotheses offered

in both the distraction and counter-attitudinal frame-
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work into a single comprehensive model of the persuasive
process.

Althou-g n the model is incomp 1 ete, it shows

promise for integrating other theoretical frameworks,
including that of inoculation theory.

A more restrictive experimental model was then
offered to test some of the key concepts of the larger
theory of persuasion, notably the basic persuasive
mechanism and the concept of cognitive distraction.
The model was then

tested experimentally.

tion was carefully executed.

The maniptlla-

A control sample of over

150 subjects established the validity of the measuring
instruments and a total of 56 volunteer subjects participated in a two by two plus two experimental design in
~hich

reward was manipulated randomly, initial attitude

was manipulated blindly, and subjects who refused to encode the message around \~.,.hich

the -experiment revo 1ved

were still administered the pre and post test as a
control on selection.

The lack of evidence of any selec-

tion bias is already the subject of a second study.
The experiment was highly successful, with both the
basic model of persuasion and the concept of cognitive
d istrac·t ion receiving , strong support e

The reSl.lltant

model of the persuasive process shows that where there
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is dissonance, persuasion results from cognitive distraction, a fot~ - ~f biased scanning.

Where, moreover,

there is no dissonance, it was shown that poor biased
scanning may result in dissuasion.

As such, the re-

sults explicitly supported none of the traditional
theories of counter-attitudinal advocacy and role
playing nearby as well as they supported the experimental
model.
It was possible, on the basis of these results,
to refine the experimental model an.d ultimately 1 tl1e
larger model of the persuasive process.

The revised

larger model, depicted in Figure 10, differs from that
presented in cl1apter 4 ~ : c.nly .in the :-e _l iminat ion ·_of two

lines, each representing a hypothesized causal link
between two variables.

Initial attitude is no longer

expected to affect counter argument.

Dissonance is no

longer expected to a f fect consonant argument.

I t is

possible, of course, that as the research expands, bot h
lines may be restored.
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The key to this experiment is in that last statement,
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because by . supporting two key elements of the larger
model, the entire. model is bolstered.

Much of the model

remains to be tested sufficiently for firm conclusions
to be drawn, but the success of ·this manipulation should
encourage the testing that will be needed if the entire
model is to be validated.

It should also encourage

attempts to incorporate other theories of the persuasive
process into the model.
Validation and expansion of this or some alternative model of the persuasive process is important to
research in persuasion because it provides the basis for
a program of systematic research.

I know of no syste-

matic program of research in the area of persuasion.•
To my knowledge, the last rue series in persuasive research was McGuire's research i n inoculation theory,
research which was concluded in the early 1960's.

Mos t

of the research in the area over t1e last few years has
been unfocused variations on past experiments! what mi ght
be called ••what tf" experimen.ts.

with .. ,~hat if .. experiments.
of persuasion.

Tl1ere • s nothing wrong

They increase our knowled ge

But there has been little done in t he

area. of tying all the ••what if" experiments together in
order to run .. research indicates" experimentse

Some ha ve
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gone so far as to think that the various research
disciplines can't- -be tied together,

It is hoped that

this experiment may help to dispel that notion.

More

important, however, it is hoped that it may prove the
basis for a systematic program of research aimed at
eventually establishing a validated comprehensive

model of persuasion.
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Table 2- Re gression of Post -1--est Quest ions on .r~ ' actor 0 11e
-. · 1 ,ltiplG ·Standardized
Unstandard i z r·:\.·:
Question Correlation
Part ia 1 Betas
Part ia 1 Bet a:.)
.99
9
.52
.261
· .J

~

11

-.46

-.256

15

.36

.192

Table 3- Regression of Rokeach Values on Factor One
Multiple
Standardized
Unstandardized
Value
. Correlation Partial Betas
Partial Betas
.07
Na~ional Security
.61
35
Equality

-.33

-.06

Freedom

.17

.04

True Freindshtp

~18

.05

Honest

.. 16

.04

.02

Independent
Pleasure

-.04

A World of Beauty

-.02

()bed ient

-.11

-.03

A \vorld of Peace

-~11

-,.02

Cheerful

-.10

- .. 02

.09

.02

Clean

constant

- 03

(v

v .12

(V.B)

Freedom

(V.l3)

(V~S)
(V~33)

F"!\CTOR ONE

Clean

(VQ23)

World of Peace
(V.4)
Ct1eerful
(V.22)

Obedient

A World of Beauty

Pleasure

Independant(V.29)

Honest

(V.l7)
(V.27)

Tru·e Frien.d ship

tJ

12)
(V .. 6)

Eqtletlit.y

.....

•

..,.

.. ..

.31

I

National Security 1.00

Values

Qo

~~ 28

1.00

~11

V.6

.22

1.00

e17

e25

Ve8

• OL~

1.00

-.13

.01

-.26

V.17

.06

-.20

1.00

.19

1$00

-.10

-.01

.15

.os

-.14

1.00

-.01

-.00

.10

-.21

-.25

-.21

.02
-.14

V.13

V.29

.11

-.14

V.27

Table 4- Correlation Matrix for Factor One Rokeach Values

-.12

1.00

-.17

-.03

-.04

-.03

.04

v.s
.oo
.oo

-.10

1.00

.oo

-~~13

1.00

-tOS

.13

QC'
':7

- .. 19

.10

1.00

Cv

.p..

j-J

.13

1.00

.03

-.19

111'.13

.17

.. OS

&06

-.13

-.08

-.16

I)

V.23

.09

4ie.l8

.18

.09

2 .::>r:
~

.... Q9

-.

-.14

-.07

: .11

• OLt

-.18

1

.09

-.16

v~22

-.01

-.19

.15

e46,

.35

V.4

-.01
.11

-.00

-.05

.02

.oo

V.33
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Table 5- Analysis of Variance for Final Attitude

Source of Variation

s ·~ s.

d(

~·lll

s ..

F Ratio

ll "

Initial Attitude

.726

1

.726

1.091

.304

Reward

.359

1

.359

.540

.468

13.040

1

13.040

19.605

Residual

23.280

35

.665

Total

37.575

38

.989

Reward X Initial
Attitude

.00009

Table 6- Group Means for Final Attitude

.so

Control

Dissonant

.85

-.46

-,55

Consonant

-.14

,.46

.65

$

Cells

$1 so
fl

Table 7- Group Means for Persuasion

.so

$

Cells

$1.50

Control

Dissonant

1.19

.03

.25

Consonant

-.71

- .. 03

.27

Table 8- Analysis of Varjance for Persuasion
Source of Variation

S ."' C
. .)

.

df.

Initial Attitude

6.89

1

6.89

10.359

.. 02

1

.02

.030

10.11

1

10.11

15.200

Residual

23.28

35

~67

Total

37.58

38

.99

Re\~ard

Reward X Initial
Attitude

·M.S.

F Ratio

_p
·• 0028

.86
.0004

Du.r·at ion

(

1
R'-=~

37

)

Argument

02

36

· a

R X I.A.

-.25

-.37

.28

.35

.10

.32

.l~8

-.02

.. 28

.31

-.24

.10

-.01

.30

• 17

.18

.01

-.10

-.36

8

.37

-.14

- . OS

I nit. ial
A.tt: it urle

Consonant He\vard

+

Courtter

R X I.A.

Consonant Reward
Argument Initial
2
(R =.14) Attitude

-. 36

• 02

.37

-.14

Total . Direct
Effect Effect

-.10

-.21

Counter . DtJrat ior1

X

.10

R X I.A.

-.25

.42

Reward

In it iai
Attitude

(R 2 =.19)

Duration

· Dependent Independent
Variable
Variable r

.oo
.oo
.oo
.oo
.oo
.oo
.oo
.oo
.oo
.oo
.oo

Joint
Effect

continued next page

.oo

.04

-.01

-. 01

-.13

.OS

Indirect Effe(;ts
dur cXc. c+c pers

Table 9- Direct and Indirect Effects of Variables in Path Model

U1

+'

1-'

-.65
.51

.,00

.65

.oo

-.10

.02

.51

-.12
.16

.52

R X I.A.

Attitude

Initial

Reward

-.10

-. 21

-.20

~~08

Duration

.oo
.oo
.oo
.oo

-.01
.61

.60

-.26

.62

.oo
.oo

.01

.15

.oo

-.01

c + c

-.19

.oo
.oo
.oo

1.10

1.10

.81

Persuasion

(R2=1.00) C X C

Attitude

Final
-.26

.31

.l~6

.35

R X I.A.

.oo

... 12-.04 • 1.9

.01

-.60

0

-.57

0 1- • 14

-a45

Attitude

•

-.01

-.09

.08

Reward
Initial
• 0Lf

-. 02

• 09 • 06

-.32

-.19

-.32

Durat:ion

.27

.oo
.oo

-.24
.55

--.24
.55

Persuasion C X C
2
c + (~
(R ! =~70)

-.28

Table 9 continued

(}\

-~">

~

35

.73427

Residual
1&0

1

.03014

Initial Attitude

Total

1

c09423

Reward

3H

1

• 14137

Reward X Initial
Attitude

df

02098

.2390

1.437

$03014
4t

.0414

.0138

p

4.492

6.738

F

.09423

.14137

( R2)

Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis of Variance
on Counter Argument

R2

10~

VariablH

Tpble

1,73

3.78

1.37

eSO consonant

1.50 dissonant

1.50 consonant

Table 12- Group · Means
Counter
Cell
Argument
$.50 dissonant
.8

3.43

1.28
8l~. 40

3.52

3.88

64.RO

.74
6.32

83.75

3.44

Counter X
Consonant

98.55

(seconds)

Argun1ent

3.97

Duration

Consonant

.27

.25

-.71

1.19

Persuas ior1

t--J
(X)

+:"
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